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Corruption is a global cause for concern due to its negative impact on development. The 
complex issues surrounding corruption have motivated many researchers, strategists and 
planners to explore strategies to combat all activities relating to its causes and effects, both in 
the public and private sector. These efforts have produced a great deal of information, ideas 
and definitions related to this subject. However, there are still some gaps in understanding, 
and scope for further exploration. This thesis looks at the anti-corruption strategies of the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), Customs Division, at Beitbridge Border Post, with 
specific reference to the following issues: causes of corruption, consequences, and gaps in the 
ZIMRA’s anti-corruption initiatives. The thesis also makes some suggestions of remedies and 
recommendations for implementation. 
This study establishes that poor and skewed remuneration within the ZIMRA has contributed 
to the officers soliciting bribes from travellers and traders. Low salaries, not only in the 
ZIMRA Customs Department but the whole public sector, have forced revenue officers to 
seek rent from travellers and traders who are also keen to avoid paying onerous customs 
duties and long queues at border posts. These long queues at the Beitbridge Border Post 
coupled with poor sanitation facilities contribute to travellers and traders offering bribes to 
customs officers so as to get quick clearances. 
The study also observes that there are weak customs clearance systems and facilities within 
the Zimbabwe customs at Beitbridge Border. For instance, technology, which could play a 
fundamental role in combating corruption as it increases transparency and accountability, 
especially through e-governance facilities, is not fully utilised. Despite the introduction of the 
Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) software it was established that customs 
officers colluded with travellers and traders to manipulate the system, which is normally 
monitored from elsewhere. 
Although data is not readily accessible due to the sensitive nature of this research, and the 
politicisation and classification of such data, such cases of corruption led to high revenue 
leakages. The study also discovered that illegal and banned substances have been smuggled 
and found their way into the country due to the inefficiency of customs officials, which is 
mainly caused by corruption.  
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Nevertheless, there are also indications that the ZIMRA considers corruption to be a problem 
that needs to be stopped. As the country has been experiencing serious internal economic 
problems, customs duties have proved to be a good source of revenue especially because of 
the huge Zimbabwean diaspora and the severe shortages of basic commodities within the 
country. However, this study observes that there is still a lack of synchronisation of anti-
corruption initiatives by the ZIMRA and other anti-corruption agencies such as the police. 
Anti-corruption strategies and remedies that may be implemented to curb increasing 
corruption cases at the border are also addressed in the study. Firstly, the existing ASYCUDA 
software, which is a significant goods clearance and corruption busting tool, should be 
properly leveraged to detect all the cases of false declaration of goods and the use of fake 
codes. This software should ideally be operated by highly motivated, correctly trained 
officials, who should also be monitored by other anti-corruption agencies. Additional 
monitoring could be done through surveillance cameras and increased lighting. In addition, 
these could be complemented by highway patrols of ZIMRA customs officials and police to 
detect and impound any smuggled or undeclared goods. Furthermore, more awareness 
campaigns should be conducted throughout the country to educate people about the evils of 
border-related corruption. 
The study also recommends that all these initiatives be accompanied by improved conditions 
of service and remuneration for customs officials. Anti-corruption agencies should be 
capacitated and optimally remunerated. Intermediate managers should be given performance 
frameworks based on best standards. However, having noted all these possible remedies, the 
study argues that, as long as the broader political environment remains weak, these initiatives 
will not generate their own internal logic and strength to work successfully, as is indeed the 
case currently. A key argument that this thesis makes is that the mere existence of 
institutions, mechanisms and instruments does not translate into an effective operation as 
long as the broader context is weak and not conducive.                                                                                       
                                   
       
            
 




Korrupsie is wêreldwyd ’n rede vir kommer vanweë die negatiewe impak wat dit op 
ontwikkeling het. Die komplekse kwessies daaromheen het vele navorsers, strategiste en 
beplanners gemotiveer om strategieë te ondersoek om alle aktiwiteite rakende die oorsake en 
gevolge daarvan in beide die openbare en die  private sektor te beveg. Hierdie pogings het ’n 
groot hoeveelheid inligting, idees en definisies in verband met hierdie onderwerp na vore 
gebring. Daar bly egter gapings in die verstaan daarvan, dus is daar is ruimte vir verdere 
ondersoek. Hierdie tesis beskou die antikorrupsiestrategieë van die  Zimbabwiese Inkomste-
owerheid (Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA)) se Doeane-afdeling by die Beitbrug-
grenspos, met spesifieke verwysing na die volgende: oorsake van korrupsie, nagevolge, en 
gapings in die antikorrupsie inisatiewe van die ZIMRA. Die tesis bied ook voorstelle met 
betrekkig tot  regstelling en doen aanbevelings vir implementering. 
Hierdie studie het vasgestel dat swak en oneweredige vergoeding in die ZIMRA daartoe 
bydra dat beamptes omkoopgeld van reisigers en handelaars vra. Lae salarisse, nie net in die 
ZIMRA doeane-afdeling nie, maar dwarsdeur die openbare sektor, het beamptes daartoe 
gedryf om huur te vra van reisigers en handelaars wat ook gretig is om die betaling van 
gewigtige doeaneregte en lang toue by grensposte te ontduik. Hierdie lang toue by die 
Beitbrug-grenspos, tesame met swak sanitasiegeriewe, dra ook daartoe by dat reisigers en 
handelaars omkoopgeld aan doeanebeamptes bied om daardeur vinniger klaring te verkry. 
Die studie noem ook die swak uitklaringstelsels en fasiliteite by die Zimbabwe doeane by die 
Beitbrug-grenspos. Tegnologie wat ’n grondliggende rol in die bestryding van korrupsie kan 
speel omdat dit deursigtigheid en aanspreeklikheid bevorder, veral deur middel van e-
staatsbestuur fasiliteite, en word byvoorbeeld nie ten volle benut nie. Ten spyte van die 
aanskaf van sagteware wat doeanedata outomatiseer (Automated System for Customs Data 
(ASYCUDA)) is vasgestel dat doeanebeamptes met reisigers en handelaars  saamspan om die 
stelsel, wat normaalweg van elders gemoniteer word, te manipuleer. 
Alhoewel data vanweë die sensitiewe aard van hierdie navorsing en die politisering  en 
klassifikasie van sodanige data nie geredelik toeganklik is nie, het sulke gevalle van korrupsie 
tot grootinkomstelekkasies gelei. Die studie het ook ontdek dat onwettige en verbode middels  
gesmokkel word en die land binnedring  as gevolg van die ondoeltreffendheid/ 
onbekwaamheid vn die doeanebeamptes, grootliks vanweë korrupsie.  
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Desnieteenstaande is daar ook tekens dat die ZIMRA korrupsie as ’n probleem ervaar wat tot 
‘n einde moet kom. Aangesien die land ernstige binnelandse ekonomiese probleme ervaar, 
word doeaneregte as ‘n goeie bron van inkomste gesien, veral vanweë die grootskaalse 
Zimbabwiese diaspora en die ernstige tekort aan basiese koopware in die land. Die studie 
ervaar egter dat daar steeds ‘n gebrek is aan gesinkroniseerde antikorrupsie inisiatiewe deur 
die ZIMRA en ander antikorrupsie instansies soos die polisie. 
Antikorrupsie strategieë en regstellings wat geïmplementeer kan word om toenemende 
gevalle van korrupsie op die grens te bekamp, word ook in die studie aaangespreek. Eerstens 
behoort die bestaande ASYCUDA-sagteware, wat ‘n beduidende instrument vir 
goedereklaring en die ontbloting van korrupsie is, behoorlik aangewend word om alle gevalle 
van valse verklaring van goedere en die gebruik van vals kodes op te spoor. Die ideaal is dat 
hierdie sagteware deur hoogs gemotiveerde an behoorlik opgeleide beamptes hanteer word en 
dat hulle ook deur ander antikorrupsie agentskappe gemoniteer word. Bykomende monitering 
kan met behulp van waarnemingskameras en verbeterde beligting gedoen word. 
Hierbenewens kan hierdie pogings aangevul word deur snelwegpatrolering deur ZIMRA 
doeanebeamptes en die polisie om enige gesmokkelde of onverklaarde ware op te spoor en te 
skut. Verder behoort meer bewusmakingsveldtogte dwarsoor die land aangebied word om 
mense oor die euwel van grensverwante korrupsie in te lig. 
Die studie beveel aan dat al hierdie inisiatiewe met verbeterde diensomstandighede en 
vergoeding vir doeane-amptenare gepaard moet gaan.  Antikorrupsie instansies behoort 
bemagtig en optimaal vergoed te word. Prestasie-raamwerke wat op beste standaarde 
gebaseer is, behoort aan intermediêre bestuurders voorsien te word. Tesame met al die 
moontlike oplossings wat genoem is , word daar egter geargumenteer dat hierdie inisiatiewe 
nie hul eie interne logika en die krag om suksesvol te werk, sal kan genereer nie so lank as 
wat die breër politieke omgewing swak bly, soos dit tans die geval is. ’n Sleutel-argument 
wat in die tesis aangevoer word is dat die blote bestaan van instellings, meganismes en 
instrumente nie in doeltreffende werking omgeskakel kan word nie so lank as die breër 
konteks swak is en nie daartoe bevorderlik is nie. 
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Chapter 1: Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Revenue collection through customs duty is one of the main sources of income for modern 
nations, including Zimbabwe. According to Moyo (2012:1), in 2011 customs duty accounted 
for 13% of Zimbabwe’s revenue collection. Since the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy 
during the last decades, a commodity crunch has forced many retailers to import a variety of 
goods for resale such as in flea markets. Levies collected on such goods entering the country 
have become one of the key sources of income for the country. However, a notable chunk of 
this revenue is also accrued from customs levies paid by ordinary cross-border traders. 
Zimbabwe’s Beitbridge border with South Africa, which is the focus of the case study of this 
research, is the busiest port of entry for cross-border trade and labour migration to and from 
Zimbabwe’s richest neighbour. These practices have become the two main complementary 
strategies of survival for many distressed Zimbabweans. Larger masses of people have been 
observed crossing the Beitbridge Border to and from South Africa than at other border posts. 
During peak periods, about 20,000 people were cleared and about 2,500 vehicles cross the 
border per day during Christmas holidays (Chronicle, 2013). 
One of the main side effects of the severe economic hardship and the huge resultant influx of 
migrants, cross-border traders and frequent importers, has been an increase in cases of 
corruption as a result of a combination of factors. Although there is a paucity of available 
data because of difficulties experienced in accessing official data and the sensitivity of this 
research, and the politicisation and classification of such data, there are cases of corruption 
that have been observed, some of which have been discovered and reported by the Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) from time to time. Some of the popular corruption 
cases/examples of corruption include: smuggling, bribes and ‘push’ money, and under-
valuing of goods. The main factors causing these cases of corruption include the inability to 
pay high import duties on some goods, congestion and slow clearance of goods, and the 
existence of underpaid and greedy customs officials who take advantage of the prevailing 
conditions to accumulate extra money. On some occasions people spend more than two days 
in queues either crossing to South Africa or back to Zimbabwe, leading to the propensity to 
bribe officials in order to gain quicker and hassle-free passage. 
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The causative factors within Zimbabwe include poverty, poor remuneration and political 
persecution which have created an enormous influx of people crossing the border. Given such 
factors, people are using many forms of corruption to enable them to cross the border with 
goods for which they do not pay the required customs duty. This is facilitated by collusion 
with customs officials who are driven into corruption by poor remuneration. There is, for 
instance, a huge influx of ex-Japanese motor vehicles that are impounded by revenue officials 
partly as a strategic ploy to drive importers into making pleas for leniency. Such pleas for 
leniency and the eventual release of vehicles are normally done through corrupt 
arrangements. The slow pace of the clearing of goods during the day and the quicker 
processing of clearance forms during the night is a cause for concern, as it suggests that there 
is a lot of collusion and corruption that is conducted under the cover of darkness. 
By way of participatory observation, the researcher frequently crossed the border and often 
observed passengers in buses not declaring goods to customs officials, suggesting that 
advance arrangements had been made to facilitate such activities. Some ZIMRA officials are 
bribed by travellers who, for instance, pay anything from R50 to R500 for the quick stamping 
of their customs clearance forms without proper verification of their goods declared. The 
amount paid as a bribe depends on the amount of goods possessed by the passenger 
concerned. The occurrence of these incidents is so common that they can be easily observed. 
This has motivated the researcher to critically investigate the efficiency of strategies that are 
in place to combat corruption at the Beitbridge Border. 
According to Moyo (2012:2), revenue collection on customs duties decreased from 13% to 
11% during the first quarter of 2012. The ZIMRA quarterly report described the decrease in 
imports and thus revenue as a result of improved industrial production capacity in Zimbabwe 
(Moyo, 2012:3). However, this assertion is found wanting as the number of cross-border 
traders has remained high. Moreover, the large volume of goods crossing the border from 
South Africa through the services of omalayitsha (private cross-border transporters) has 
remained significantly high. There are always long queues of travellers to declare goods, 
which remains a curious issue requiring closer investigation and the examination of the 
strategies used by the ZIMRA to prevent this. 
Huge amounts of goods which have crossed the border illegally without any customs duty 
being paid have been discovered within the country by ZIMRA investigators. Some of the 
goods would have been undervalued, especially motor vehicles (ZIMRA, 2013:1). There are 
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indications that, although some high-level ZIMRA officials are keen to stamp out corruption 
as it dents their capacity to produce revenue from the country’s busiest border post as 
expected, their mechanisms have been spasmodic and ineffective. Counter measures such as 
the mounting of highway patrols have not sufficiently ended the problem as both the ZIMRA 
officials and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) officers responsible for these patrols are 
similarly poorly paid and easily corruptible. 
In light of the above situation, it is apparent that increasing police personnel has not 
necessarily helped to solve the problem of corruption. In actual fact, some of these patrols are 
money-making schemes. Moyo (2011:1) discusses the very high volumes of illegally 
imported goods entering the country through various ports of entry, with Beitbridge being 
one of the main culprits. Huge sums of potential revenue are lost through leakages linked to 
corruption. Despite the introduction of the Automated System for Customs Data 
(ASYCUDA) software at the border, it was established that customs officers colluded with 
travellers and traders to manipulate the system. There is a huge influx of corruptly imported 
goods which, if correctly levied, could add to the state’s poor coffers. Apart from the loss of 
revenue, corruption has also reduced the moral standing of the country’s civil service. 
It is against this background that this research was conceived with the aim to investigate and 
analyse the problems with the strategies used by the ZIMRA to combat corruption. The main 
observation of the thesis is that the mere existence of anti-corruption mechanisms and 
institutions does not guarantee effectiveness as long as the broader political economy and 
macro-economic environment are weak. Such institutions and mechanisms can only work if 
the conditions are optimal, guaranteeing full, diligent and coordinated implementation of the 
necessary instruments. Notable capacity and technical inefficiencies notwithstanding, the 
ZIMRA seems to have the basic necessary mechanisms in place. However, these are 
undermined by a generally distressed political economic environment which weakens them 
immensely. 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The imposition of customs duties is one of the main revenue collection strategies used by 
governments to enable them to pay for essential services for its citizens. However, the 
customs duty collection process is prone to corruption. Corrupt officials often solicit or 
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receive bribes from travellers who seek to avoid paying high customs duty (Bate, 2000:15). 
Many travellers and traders seek to circumvent the system by taking advantage of officials 
who easily succumb to corruption due to their own circumstances, resulting in negative 
effects on the country’s revenue. However, before elaborating on this it is important to define 
the key operational concept, that is corruption, and to identify some of its main forms. 
1.2.2 Definition of corruption 
The term corruption has been interpreted widely and in a variety of ways. Advocate Thuli 
Madonsela, in her address to the 13th Winelands Conference on Corruption, likened 
corruption to a “cancer that requires quarantine and should be dealt with appropriately to 
create a healthy society” (Nieuwoudt, 2012:11). Equating corruption with cancer shows how 
dangerous it is and describes its rapid spread which can cause an unstable society. To create a 
healthy society, anti-corruption strategies must be employed in a country before it reaches an 
uncontrollable level. 
Campos and Pradhan (2007:9), and Ackerman (1999:91) define corruption as the use of 
public office for private gain. Using public funds without authorisation or using state 
resources or funds for private gain is corruption. Le, in Campos and Pradhan (2007:335) 
asserts that, in developing countries, revenue administration agencies are ranked as the most 
corrupt public institutions. They further state that corruption in tax and customs 
administration leads to inefficiency and equity problems. Rose-Ackerman (1999:9) outlines 
the symptoms of corruption in public office as an indication of the poor management skills of 
the state. A country which is corrupt has low arrests and prosecution rates which are 
indicative of a failed state in which management needs to come up with effective anti-
corruption strategies. 
Scholars believe that corruption emanates from individuals in a society who fail to find 
themselves in a productive environment (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:3). These failures lead to 
rent-seeking by those who have failed to fit into a productive society. Tanzi and Davoodi in 
Rose-Ackerman (1999:3) assert that corruption reduces total investment in an economy and, 
at the same time, leads to excessive spending by government as they try to combat corruption 
in society. Rose-Ackerman (1999:27) ranks corruption into two levels. The first level 
mentioned is ‘grand corruption’ which he says occurs within high levels of society. 
Ackerman argues that grand corruption features high profile government and other officials 
being involved in dodgy deals. In cases where high profile government officials are engaged 
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in corrupt activities, there is a tendency that the lower level or junior officers are also 
involved in corruption. Dealing with such corruption would require broader institutional 
reform which can underpin a good integrated governance framework premised on 
accountability, transparency and performance management (Campos & Pradhan, 2007:369). 
The second aspect of corruption is low level corruption. As will be elaborated later in the 
thesis, low level corruption mainly involves routine forms of corruption among junior public 
service officers and ordinary people. 
1.2.3 Forms of corruption 
Corruption comes in various forms including bribes, kickbacks, collusion, bid rigging and 
fraud. For purposes of this research, particular attention will be paid to bribery. According to 
Carr (2009:155) bribery is the immediate or delayed mutual exchange of benefit in return for 
undeserved monetary benefit or otherwise. Campos and Pradhan (2007:9) define a bribe as a 
payment to a government official for any type of favour. In essence it is unethical conduct 
within an organisation whereby for one to execute his/her duties there has to be an associated 
reciprocal favour in return. Unethical conduct in the workplace can be defined as an explicit 
or implicit part of bad governance (Bovaird & Loffler, 2003:56). 
1.3 Research problem  
Although the ZIMRA claims to be intolerant of corruption, this maleficence continues 
unabated at the Beitbridge Border Post. Like other state institutions, the ZIMRA has a 
selection of institutions, instruments and mechanisms that can be deployed to stamp out 
corruption. However, it is apparent that these existing mechanisms have not had much of an 
impact. This research seeks to uncover the missing link, with guidance from the following 
research questions: 
 What forms of corruption are rife at Beitbridge Border Post? 
 What are the current anti-corruption strategies in the ZIMRA Customs Department 
that are being applied at Beitbridge Border Post? 
 How effective are the anti-corruption strategies within the ZIMRA’s Customs 
Department?  
 How can the existing anti-corruption strategies within the ZIMRA be strengthened or 
improved? 
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1.4 Goal and objectives 
The goal of the thesis is to assess the effectiveness and adequacy of the anti-corruption 
strategies used by the ZIMRA to combat corruption related to customs revenue collection at 
Beitbridge Border Post. In order to achieve this goal, the following objectives will be 
pursued: 
 Identify and describe cases of corruption that took place at the Beitbridge Border Post 
within the last five years. 
 Outline the existing anti-corruption strategies and assess their implementation. 
 Suggest other possible ways of strengthening the existing anti-corruption strategies. 
1.5 Research design and methodology 
The research will use a non-empirical research design in the form of a case study to collect 
data. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell, (2005:149) define secondary data as information 
collected by other agencies other than the researcher. It is existing data collected for use in a 
research study. The research design follows a case study framework that is premised on 
thorough case analysis. Kitay and Callus (1998:103) define a case study as a research strategy 
or design that is used to study one or more selected social phenomena in-depth before placing 
them in a wider perspective. 
Mouton (2001:149) argues that a case study approach is relevant to an organisation that is 
departmentalised into smaller sub-entities such as the ZIMRA. The case study approach can 
also be used to investigate the dynamics of a single limited system that is typical of social 
nature which has a unique and idiosyncratic character (Mouton, 2001:279; Welman, Kruger 
& Mitchell, 2005:25). A case study method of research is more relevant because it provides a 
researcher with an opportunity for in-depth analysis of particularly complex issues such as 
the ZIMRA’s anti-corruption strategies, which require fine-grained analysis. 
The research mainly employs a qualitative methodology which enables the researcher to 
extensively explore cases of corruption and strategies that have been used to combat 
corruption with a special focus on transparency and accountability. According to Locke, 
Spirduso and Silverman (2007:96), qualitative research is a systematic, empirical strategy for 
answering questions about people in a particular social context rather than generalisation 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 
 
through interaction. This method is deployed to understand both the regularities and 
irregularities when describing what people do. The data set is non-quantitative. 
1.6 Data collection 
According to Borg and Gall (1989:385), a qualitative approach focuses on meaning, 
experiences and social realities which are purposively selected and observed by the 
researcher. Based on a theoretical or judgemental approach, the thesis depended upon a 
number of data sources that included documents, research studies, articles, electronic and 
print media, books on corruption and legislative documents. It should be explicitly stated that, 
because of the sensitivity of this topic, the researcher was denied access to key institutional 
documents and data that could have enriched a study of this nature. However, the available 
sources were enough to make key observations. Data on the cases studied was collected 
through an electronic search for cases of corruption reported in the media. 
1.7 Validity 
The researcher minimised common threats of invalidity by citing articles and other sources 
that are authentic and credible as sources of information. The issue of statistical validity was 
not considered to be paramount. The cases described and analysed here can be easily verified 
by any interested future researcher. Some of the cases explored in the thesis were reported in 
national newspapers and are in the public domain. None of these cases were publicly 
challenged as being invalid. 
1.8 Data analysis 
Collected data was carefully coded and analysed for internal logic and coherence before 
being cross-referenced. This approach was deployed in the fine-grained analysis of the 
existing documentation on corruption and anti-corruption strategies to be able to draw 
meaningful conclusions on the strategies the ZIMRA uses to combat corruption. Conclusions 
were therefore drawn from a critical analysis of the strategies that the ZIMRA Customs 
Department use to combat corruption. 
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1.9 Chapter outline 
Chapter 1: Background 
This is the introductory chapter that provides an overview of the research. It also covers the 
research methodology, design and instruments that have been used in this research. It sets the 
tone for the entire thesis. 
Chapter 2: Corruption – A literature-based analysis 
This chapter covers a great deal of the literature review and addresses some of the key 
concepts related to the study. The chapter has the following sections: 
 Overview  
 Corruption and anti-corruption 
 Anti-corruption strategies 
 Policy and legislative framework on anti-corruption 
Chapter 3: Customs corruption in Southern Africa: a Zimbabwe case study 
This chapter explores conceptual models and frameworks governing anti-corruption 
strategies in Zimbabwe. This chapter will highlight the context of anti-corruption, policy and 
legislative framework on corruption by the Zimbabwean government. The chapter will also 
assess the functioning and application of legislative and other policies on corruption by this 
government. 
Chapter 4: Corruption in the Zimbabwean customs system: a Beitbridge case analysis 
In this chapter the thesis will look at the case study of anti-corruption strategies employed by 
the ZIMRA Customs Department at Beitbridge Border Post. 
Chapter 5: Summary, findings and recommendations 
This chapter covers the findings, recommendations and conclusions. 




Using a set of tried and tested methods; this thesis attempts a careful analysis of the ZIMRA 
anti-corruption initiatives to establish their context and efficiency. As the ZIMRA is a key 
state institution which produces much needed revenue, it is imperative that such an institution 
should be constantly subjected to public critical scrutiny in order to safeguard its integrity. 
This research aims to make a small contribution to understanding some key issues. 
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Chapter 2: Corruption – A Literature-Based Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will elaborate on the definitions and theories behind the nature, causes and 
solutions to corruption. Secondly, it will analyse anti-corruption strategies as applied in the 
customs context. As corruption has become a growing developmental concern, scholars and 
practitioners alike have devoted a great deal of time to understanding the complexities of 
corruption and exploring the different mechanisms for combating the scourge. Drawing on 
these works, this chapter begins by looking at how corruption has been defined. It then 
proceeds to look at the different types of corruption, thereafter turning to the diverse 
theoretical perspectives. The following section addresses the different causes of corruption 
that have been identified by scholars and practitioners. This is followed by sections focusing 
on the manifestations, consequences and remedies of, and for, corruption. Thereafter, the 
chapter focuses on the issue of corruption in the context of customs and addresses the 
different sub-topics that are relevant for a fuller understanding of the subject under review. 
2.2 Corruption 
2.2.1 Corruption defined  
The preceding chapter provided a definition and also gave a brief background on the various 
facets of corruption and the different ways in which it manifests itself. However, it is 
important to provide a fuller review of how corruption has been defined in order to offer a 
firmer theoretical base from which to proceed to explore this study. 
Corruption is the abuse of the public office or entrusted power and authority for one’s private 
or personal benefit which goes against the interests of the people (Carr, 2009:155; NORAD, 
2009:40; Heymans & Lipietz, 1999:36; Uneke, 2010:111; Rose-Ackerman, 1999:2). This 
definition clearly indicates how people in the public office abuse power to satisfy their selfish 
interests at the expense of the people they serve. According to Kututwa (2005:3), the abuse of 
public office involves being dishonest in executing a public duty. Kututwa (2005:3) further 
outlines the following examples of the abuse of public office and power as per observation by 
African Union (AU) heads of state: 
 Soliciting of gifts or services directly or indirectly by public officials or any person; 
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 The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, of any monetary value or goods or 
gifts for favour to a public official or any other person; 
 Omission in the discharge of her or his duties by a public official or any other person 
for the purposes of obtaining undeserved benefits; 
 Diversion of resources or abdication of duty by a public official in order do other 
duties for purposes of personal gain; 
 Creating undue advantage by a public official through the exercise of any improper 
influence over a decision; 
 Increased accumulation of assets by public officials or any other person through 
illegal means. 
Essentially, this means that corruption is the obtaining or acquiring of benefits illegally in 
return for favours in the form of rewards such as gifts. When public officials offer benefits to 
friends or relatives it must not compromise the integrity of the public service. If it does, this 
is classified as corruption. More so, a benefit that is offered as compensation for an 
illegitimate means of acquiring a good or service also constitutes corruption. 
Rotberg (2009:27) defines corruption as a social and political ill because it leads to a decline 
in the moral fibre and standing of society especially when perpetrated by people who are 
voted into power as custodians of common wealth. Bribery, extortion and embezzlement are 
all ills that heighten the levels of distrust between public officials and citizens. A bribe is also 
an ill because it leads to the exercise of undue influence with the intention of gaining undue 
favours (Rotberg, 2009:27). What this means is that those without resources to bribe with are 
left out and disadvantaged. 
Kututwa (2005:3) defines corruption as an evil that reduces productivity, encourages laziness 
and leads to sub-standards products, sorrow, distress or calamity as well as suffering to a 
person or community. The other social and political evils of corruption involve the elicit 
dealing in state resources for one’s personal gain whilst creating suffering among 
communities through the diversion of resources (Rotberg, 2009:27). When the systems of 
governance have been corrupted, the principles of equality and fairness become 
compromised. In such cases the poor become the victims of corrupt governance. This is a 
form of injustice. Uneke (2010:111) defines corruption as a horizontal web of dishonesty and 
injustice. In other words, corruption involves the pervasion of laws and procedures that guide 
the conduct of public servants. In a further elaboration of this point, Rotberg (2009:27) 
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defines corruption as the violation of established rules for self-gain. People violate the law to 
accumulate wealth by illegitimate means at the expense of the public. The rightful 
beneficiaries are denied the opportunity to access the resources or services through 
manipulation of laws to circumvent the laid down procedures of accessing and distributing 
wealth. 
Heidenheimer, Johnston and Levine (1989:9) define corruption as the use of rewards to 
prevent the judgment of a person in a position of trust, bestowal of patronage by reason of 
prescriptive relationship rather than merit, and the illegal appropriation of public resources 
for private use. Patronage creates inequality as services or goods in the public service are 
awarded based on relationships. Such corruption creates imbalance in the allocation of 
resources and also makes a mockery of competence standards. 
Definitions of corruption vary from one jurisdiction to another and from one organisation to 
another (Bakamba, 2009:3). Despite these important variations and points of emphasis, it is 
important to note that all definitions points to the abuse of power and office for private gain 
at the expense of the public. For purposes of further clarity, it is important to shed light on the 
different types of corruption as it presents itself in different guises. In the next part of this 
thesis, the different types of corruption will be explored, and will be aligned with the various 
jurisdictions and organisations where such forms exist. 
2.2.2 Types of corruption 
The previous paragraphs presented the different scholarly views regarding corruption. 
Logically, it is vital to follow up on these definitions by illuminating the various types of 
corruption that scholars have identified and explored. The next section will pay particular 
attention to bribery, theft and fraud, and institutional corruption. There are many other forms 
but the forms listed here are adequate for illustrative purposes in this study. 
2.2.2.1 Bribery 
Bribery is a process through which payment is made for the purpose of acquiring favours and 
opportunities over another person who stands to benefit from this act (Kututwa 2005:3; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999:15; DPSA, 2002:7). Bribes may include tax exemption which occurs when 
someone avoids paying tax through dubious means such as bribing the tax officials to under 
charge tax. Another type of bribe includes the making of a payment to gain undue preference 
or favour. This can involve bribing officials to prevent them from performing their lawful 
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duties such as the careful checking and verification of goods at border posts or road blocks 
for compliance. Rose-Ackerman, (1999:15) defines such bribes as an incentive bonus. Bribes 
might start at minute levels and continue to grow into more damaging forms of corruption 
(Kututwa, 2005:6). This implies that the long-term effects of corruption can be damaging 
even if not significant in the short term. Bribery is an incentive payment that is illegal and 
used to avoid delays in the attainment of ones’ needs (Kututwa, 2005:3). Normally, people do 
not like delays and other forms of inconvenience hence they will use any means to make sure 
they receive what they want without delay. 
2.2.2.2 Fraud 
Heymans and Lipietz (1999:6) assert that fraud occurs when a public officer acquires state 
assets through illegal transactions or means. Such a perverted method of acquiring assets in 
general constitutes fraud. Normally fraud involves self-enrichment through the transfer of 
assets from state or a private entity to an individual or group’s ownership (Heymans & 
Lipietz, 1999:6). These transfers accrue to public servants, or any other entity. A good 
example is a case whereby a public servant registers a fictitious employee in order to collect 
the salary of this employee (DPSA, 2002:7). Fraud is therefore a criminal offence that should 
be punishable by fine or a prison sentence because it unfairly prejudices the state and its 
citizens alike. 
2.2.2.3 Institutional corruption 
Institutional corruption is also associated with the misuse of decision-making procedures by 
those in authority to manipulate rules and laws so as to facilitate self-interest (Heymans & 
Lipietz, 1999:6). Heymans and Lipietz (1996:6) further assert that when laws and rules are 
waived, bribery and favouritism become the main means of interaction between public and 
private interests. This has a tendency to increase the rate of occurrence of corruption because 
the prerogative of public servants to make decisions and laws is easily manipulated to favour 
those with networks linking them to officers in government. Manipulation and waiving of 
laws to suit self-gratification is an example of how institutions’ mechanisms are disregarded 
at the expense of public interest. DPSA (2002:7) further explains institutional corruption as 
follows: 
 Extortion which involves coercing individuals or entities to grant private gain to a 
public servant in exchange for an offering, or act in a particular manner. 
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 Abuse of power which involves the use of vested authority to influence a decision 
in a discriminatory manner that provides a private benefit. 
 Conflict of interest which involves the public servant failing to act impartially on 
matters where he or she has a vested interest such as those involving family or any 
form of relationship. 
 The abuse of privileged information which involves the use of such information 
and knowledge to create an unfair advantage to other persons. 
 Favouritism, which involves the provision of services or goods to a public 
servant’s affiliation. 
 Nepotism, which involves the involvement of a family member in the public 
service to access a service, good or employment. 
These kinds of corruption may vary depending on the jurisdiction in which they are 
identified. For the purpose of this discussion it is imperative to use these identified types of 
corruption to provide a theoretical analysis as explored in the next section. 
2.2.3 Theoretical perspectives on corruption 
There are several existing theories on public sector corruption which have been found 
relevant for this study. These include the violation of law perspective, breach of duty 
perspective, the betrayal perspective, market failure perspective, and subversion of public 
interest theory (Rotberg, 2009:28). This implies that corruption involves deviation from the 
laws, failure to honour the contractual agreement, untrustworthy behaviour and greed. These 
issues are explored in relative detail in the next few paragraphs. 
2.2.3.1 The violation of law perspective 
The violation of law perspective is a theory which argues that corruption is based on the 
common sense observation theory that understands corruption as a deviation from the normal 
or agreed set of laws and standards of a society (Rotberg, 2009:28). The violation of law 
perspective is also known as the public office-legalist perspective. This theory suggests that 
legal institutions are independent from government, for example, the anti-corruption agencies 
such as anti-corruption commissions or any legal institutions created by means of law to 
combat corruption within state institutions. With regards to the relationship between illegal 
acts and what is believed to be corrupt, it has been observed that not all illegal acts are 
closely connected to corruption. However, the illegality judgement that makes the conduct 
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corrupt is because of pre-existing reasons and conditions that lead a particular conduct to be 
defined as corrupt (Rotberg, 2009:28). Even though a violation of law must be treated as 
corruption, not all matters relating to corruption would attain similar attention, such as 
bribing one to jump forward in a queue to buy bread. However, a bribe to influence a tender 
process in procurement procedures legitimately attracts public and statutory attention as it is a 
serious case of the violation of clearly set out tender laws. Violation of law must be treated as 
a criminal offence that should be punishable in a court of law. Every organisation has its own 
set of rules and regulations which set standards to create harmony amongst its members. The 
violation of such principles normally occurs in cases of incompetence, impunity or corrupt 
officials (Rotberg, 2009:28).  
2.2.3.2 The breach of duty theory  
The breach of duty theory emanates from political and legal literature. According to the 
breach of duty perspective, corruption develops from the failure of a public official to honour 
the code of conduct by indulging in bribery, extortion, embezzlement or any other form of 
corruption motivated by private gain (Rotberg, 2009:30). Breach of duty involves the 
violation of the established laws of an organisation or government in which a public official 
gets involved in ethical or moral misconduct that is contrary to the set rules and regulations of 
the organisation or government. One can argue that the breach of duty theory has loopholes 
as it should critically provide a legal understanding of contractual agreements given the low 
educational levels in Africa. Therefore, it is inconclusive to declare the supremacy of the 
theory to explain corruption. 
2.2.3.3 The betrayal of interest theory 
This theory relates to issues of trust (Rotberg, 2009:31). An officer being untrustworthy to 
people who have bestowed trust in him/her is completely betraying those people. Public 
officials are expected to behave in a manner that is morally acceptable in society. When the 
public officials’ actions in the execution of their work differ from the set procedures and 
requirements of each office, they betray the trust of the people whom they serve. Rotberg 
(2009:31) mentions that the betrayal theory regards corruption as a kind of breach of duty 
which translates into the betrayal of trust from the public. The breach of duty theory and 
betrayal of trust theory concur in that they view corruption as relating to a loss of trust by the 
public that must be served well by public officials who resort to unfaithful and untrustworthy 
ways in carrying their mandate as public officials. Therefore, demanding bribes, extortion or 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
any corrupt activity is a betrayal of trust as public officials indulge in breach of contractual 
agreements as laid down in the public service policies and regulations. 
2.2.3.4 The inequality theory 
According to Rotberg (2009:31), corruption can be deemed as having been committed when 
transactions between politicians and citizens subvert or circumvent the democratic processes 
normally associated with equality, values and equity. This involves denial of equal 
opportunity as it is normally linked with unfairness and the dispensing of unequal favours and 
benefits. Unfair allocation of tenders, bribery and kickbacks in favour of whoever paid the 
bribe creates unfairness and leads to the creation of unequal opportunities among citizens. 
2.2.3.5 The public interest theory  
Public interest theory states that corruption is a self-seeking behaviour that endeavours to 
fulfil personal gratification at the expense of citizens (Rotberg, 2009:31). Self-seeking 
behaviour which overlooks public interest is a perversion of principle that only results in the 
satisfaction of individual egos at the expense of the majority citizens who deserve services. 
This theoretical perspective takes us back to the definition of corruption and its private-public 
nexus. 
With these theoretical perspectives in mind, it is useful to consider the specific conditions 
that promote corruption. The next part of this chapter will closely explore those common 
conditions that allow corruption to thrive in the public sector. 
2.2.4 Conditions promoting corruption 
The following conditions promote the continued existence of corruption in public spheres: 
skewed incentives, weakness in the judiciary system, lack of improved technology, poverty, 
discretional powers by public officials, and lack of political will to combat cases of 
corruption. What emerges from the following discussion is that there are complex conditions 
that breed corruption, which make it widespread and differing in origin, manifestation and 
impact. 
2.2.4.1 Incentive payment 
Skewed incentives in the public sector tend to create rent-seeking behaviour as a way of 
compensation for the perceived low incentives and gaps in remuneration among employees. 
Kenny (1999:6) argues that when the benefit from corruption exceeds the benefit from the 
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incentive of work done, this may cause public officials to prefer corrupt means. Skewed 
incentives normally push officials to seek rent from people who become vulnerable to 
corruption. However, despite low work incentives as compared to corruption incentives, 
Rotberg (2009:31) argues that indulging in corruption is breach of duty as well as the betrayal 
of trust by people entrusted with the official responsibility to work without bias or favour. 
Low incentive, as a means to justify corruption, is baseless and lacks a clear understanding of 
being a public servant. 
Discretionary powers by public officials lead to temptation to solicit and seek rent from 
clients such as during the calculation of tariffs (Gatti, 1999:2). Public officials are pushed to 
corrupt means in cases where incentives received in the form of salaries are far less than 
incentives from kickbacks and bribes. The risk of losing job benefits is viewed as less 
important than the gains obtained from corruption. Discretional powers without monitoring 
tools are equally a perpetrator of corruption opportunities (Gatti, 1999:2). 
2.2.4.2 Weaknesses in the judicial system 
Weaknesses within judicial systems lead to poor prosecution rates of perpetrators of 
corruption in many countries’ public sectors. This problem can be attributed to a lack of rule 
of law. In a country where rule of law does not exist, governance structures tend to be weak 
and easy to manipulate in ways that undermine democracy and development (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999:143). Rose-Ackerman (1999:143) further argues that public accountability 
is necessary, whether the country is democratic or autocratic, as long as there are necessary 
tools to combat corruption. Some democratic countries resist accountability which creates 
opportunities or gaps for corruption. 
Corruption predominantly occurs in countries whose democratic principles, such as 
transparency and accountability, do not exist. NORAD (2009:23) asserts the importance of 
rule of law in creating democratic principles that are tools for creating anti-corruption 
institutions used to combat corruption. Democratically elected governments have the 
potential to establish institutions that are credible enough not to use corrupt elements. Among 
other things, democracy creates a plain field for media to play an oversight role in a country 
by establishing accessibility to information which is a key pillar for anti-corruption strategies 
(NORAD, 2009:36). The role of media as an anti-corruption strategy is to expose illicit 
dealings in the public sector which the law enforcement agency can use as a starting point for 
investigation. Without the instruments of democracy, corruption is hidden from most public 
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servants as they are protected by a lack of transparent institutions to prosecute corrupt 
officials. 
2.2.4.3 Lack of efficient technology 
Lack of appropriate technology such as e-government that facilitates transparency also 
enables public officials to engage in corrupt activities (Shah, 2007:63). Shah defines e-
government as a technology that helps citizens to access government information digitally or 
through the internet. When information is readily available within the public domain, chances 
of corruption are minimised and, in the absence of e-government initiatives, corruption 
becomes easily perpetrated by corrupt officials as they are not easily exposed. In essence, 
corruption takes place where there are fewer checks and balances within an organisation such 
as in technologically disadvantaged countries. 
2.2.4.4 Poverty 
Poverty is another driving force for corruption. The Warioba Commission in Tanzania found 
that some cases of petty corruption are motivated by need, whereby officials are driven by the 
need for money to take care of their families (NORAD, 2009:42). Generally, petty corruption 
is corruption motivated by poverty. According to the Warioba Commission, as cited in 
NORAD (2009:41), the grounds for petty corruption claims are viewed as dubious since 
officials have a salary. However, even though this petty corruption is defined as dubious by 
the Warioba Commission, the underlying fact is that most employees are pushed to solicit 
bribes due to low salaries. Workers earning low salaries tend to live in poverty; hence 
corruption becomes a means to supplement their low income. 
2.2.4.5 Lack of political will 
A lack of political will is another serious problem hampering efforts to combat corruption. 
Kututwa (2005:37) identifies reasons behind this lack of political will by government to 
combat corruption as the lack of initiative, openness or transparency in addressing problems 
of corruption. Political will is associated with high profile government officials, and weak 
and politicised criminal justice systems that are incapable of prosecuting corrupt officials. 
Kututwa (2005:37) eludes to the lack of political will as the failure by government to create 
democratic principles with respect to, for instance, the provision of press freedom and an 
independent judiciary system. Kututwa (2005:38) is of the view that some African countries 
make efforts to craft and implement democratic principles merely as a means to access World 
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Bank loans rather than formulating genuine anti-corruption strategies. In such cases where 
anti-corruption strategies are implemented, Kututwa (2005:38) asserts that these would be 
intended to target political opposition. Such anti-corruption efforts are a clear indication of a 
lack of political will by the government to combat corruption. In Ghana, the introduction of 
investigation institutions to combat corruption has posed complex challenges. As Kututwa 
(2005:41) asserts, Ghana’s anti-corruption efforts are not successful as they are simple 
declarations of intent to combat corruption but lack concrete action. In essence anti-
corruption strategies exist in principle on paper but are not implemented. 
Having explored the conditions under which corruption thrives, it is also important to 
illuminate how corruption manifests itself. Again a great deal of literature has been very 
fruitful in this regard. The next part of the chapter therefore elaborates on the ways in which 
corruption manifests. Understanding the manifestation of corruption would provide the 
knowledge base for crafting appropriate remedial strategies. 
2.2.5 Manifestations of corruption 
Corruption is a menace to any society as it is associated with many vices. Its foundation is 
rooted in injustice, mistrust and suspicion, and it flourishes well where government 
institutions, such as the legislative and judiciary systems, are weak, and the policy and 
regulatory regimes which provide an oversight role are marginalised or corrupted (Myint, 
2000:33). It is therefore important to analyse the manifestation of corruption. Corruption can 
manifest itself as rent-seeking. According to Klitgaard (1998) cited in Myint (2000:33) this 
form of corruption can be conceived of as follows: 
C = R + D – A 
In the above equation, C stands for corruption, R for economic rent, D for discretionary 
powers, and A for accountability. The equation explains the matrix that, the greater the 
opportunities for rent seeking, the greater chance of corruption within an organisation. The 
discretional powers of the officials, especially in the public offices, granted without 
boundaries leads to more chances and opportunities for bribes and rent seeking. 
Accountability of public office bearers minimises corruption and vice versa. In cases where 
office bearers are not accountable, this opens windows for corrupt activities. Myint (2000:39) 
further explains the catalyst for corruption based on the following conditions: 
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 Economic activities restricted by administrative, legal and regulatory orders that 
create gaps for economic rent. This economic rent is more common in cases where 
there is no transparency in business dealings. It is also possible for economic rent to 
find its way into the citizenship when business operates in a monopolistic and non-
competitive environment. 
 Administrators are given a lot of discretionary powers to interpret and apply the law. 
Interpretation of the law varies especially if not clearly written and leaves opportunity 
to invoke, amend or alter procedure that can promote corruption. 
 Lack of accountability by administrators makes corruption opportunities abound. 
Corruption occurs in various levels, mainly high and low. Myint (2000:39) defines high level 
corruption as corruption perpetuated by top politicians and other officials associated with 
high profile offices that are privileged. Systems of government are manipulated to suit 
political agendas. One example of a form of corruption that involves politicians is a flawed 
election process that enables rigging in favour of certain individuals in top offices. Those 
elected to occupy top offices are then used as a vehicle for corruption within the government. 
Those people who campaign for politicians are rewarded with kickbacks as compensation for 
aiding candidates in their quest for political office. 
Low level corruption is defined as corruption that involves the junior officers in public 
services such as clerks and or traffic officers who solicit payment for quick processing of a 
service (Myint, 2000:39). It is believed that public servants solicit kickbacks or bribes to 
supplement their low salaries. Myint (2000:39) argues that public servants either resort to 
absenteeism or corruption to supplement their low income. In most cases when they are at 
work, it is done in such a way as to create the opportunity to seek rent. 
Another way in which corruption manifests itself is when it becomes widespread and the 
norm in a society. Myint (2000:39) reckons that this is an endemic and systematic type of 
corruption that takes over the country’s law institutions and affects people’s behaviour and 
way of life. When corruption is a way of life, it is very difficult to control and its 
consequences have devastating effects on the country. 
Corruption emerges where there is a confused state of affairs within a country or 
organisation. Myint (2000:41) argues that chaotic corruption can be a result of a confused 
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state of affairs. There is no clear system to follow hence the decision of how much to pay and 
who to pay remains the discretion of the officers. 
Myint (2000:42) further notes another type of corruption, that is, well-organised corruption or 
corruption operated by a syndicate of well-known people who have clearly defined means of 
bribery. Such cases are more common in public service where officers are part of a syndicate 
to delay processes in delivering a service so that clients resort to bribes. Rotberg (2009:30) 
reiterates that corruption by public servants is a breach of duty. It is common sense that 
organised crime, such as creating a chaotic environment to avail an opportunity for corruption 
is a serious breach of duty and a betrayal of citizens’ trust by those entrusted with the 
responsibility to occupy office. 
Corruption is a two-way process whereby the receiver and giver of the bribe are both 
accomplices to a crime. Most anti-corruption advocacies concentrate on the receiving side of 
a bribe, overlooking the supply side (Myint, 2000:43). Since the remedies for corruption have 
concentrated on the receiving side, the giving side has been viewed as consisting of innocent 
victims of bribes. Although corruption normally involves two parties, its consequences are 
felt by the society at large, as indicated in the next section. 
2.2.6 Consequences of corruption 
Corruption permeates almost every area of public life of ordinary citizens, particularly in 
African countries. Failure by some countries to combat corruption has led to the proliferation 
of ungovernable state institutions and caused economic decline (Uneke, 2010:124; Mauro, 
1998:12). It is therefore imperative to assess some of the consequences of corruption such as 
loss of government revenue, distorted government expenditure, instability of the country, 
poverty, lack of economic growth, and wastage of state resources. 
Abuse of power for personal gain has serious consequences for revenue collection by 
government, such as the reduction of efficiency, loss of revenue through leakages, and the 
transfer of resources from companies and government to individual officials in the public 
sector (Gratti, 1999:5). Corruption transfers resources from public institutions to individuals 
through illegal means. As cited earlier, corruption is a means of transferring state and other 
institutional/organisational resources or goods for personal gain. The driving factors may 
vary from one person to another and one organisation to another. 
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Corruption distorts the composition of government expenditure (Mauro, 2010:12). Corrupt 
government officials spend more public resources on services or goods that attract large 
bribes. These are items whose value it is difficult to monitor and, more often, they are 
produced in a market with limited or no competition. Mauro (2010:12) gives an example of 
the choice of expenditure on fighter aircraft which attract politicians rather than on textbooks 
for education and teachers’ salaries, which may generate greater economic growth than the 
former. Such corruption has an adverse effect on economic growth. According to Mauro 
(2010:12), corruption reduces economic growth by lowering private investment in a country. 
Corruption leads to instability in a country, especially when ingrained into individuals and 
regimes. Mauro (2010:13) alludes to the extent to which corruption can cause damage to the 
political arena where regimes tend to be formed by corrupt groups of gangs who endeavour to 
unseat the government through coups for the purpose of protecting their corrupt activities. 
Rotberg (2009:9) cites the Mugabe regime whose partnership with cantankerous elements in 
politics protects Mugabe’s power and corrupt syndicate and criminal political operations. 
Corrupt politicians tend to create a network of criminal activities that allow, for instance, the 
smuggling of weapons. Corruption allows weapons to flow into countries whose democratic 
credentials are questionable, and such activities reinforce the pursuit of corrupt activities by 
weakening the stability of the country. 
Corruption breeds poverty and vice versa. Most poor countries are associated with high 
corruption indices (Mauro, 2010:13; Heymans & Lipietz, 1999:12). It is, therefore, important 
to check the consequences of corruption rather than the causes of poverty. Normally people 
tend to break the rules of honesty and decency if they live in pervasive poverty. This applies 
to a great deal of low level corruption. However, because corruption skews the allocation of 
resources and services, it tends to create inequality thereby making some people poorer, with 
the knock-on effect being the suspension of rules of honesty and decency. Mauro (2010:13) 
asserts that poor people tend to abandon their moral principles when resources are sparse. 
This therefore creates a vicious cycle of corruption and poverty. 
Corruption is like a cancer that spreads and ravages the entire body (Rotberg, 2009:9). It has 
increased in various forms, creating links between different mafias and organisations with 
damaging effects on economic growth and development in countries as it promotes 
inefficiency and greed (Theobald, 1990, as cited in Uneke, 2010:118). Where corruption is 
endemic, public enterprises become ineffective, inefficient and wasteful to the extent of being 
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persistently bailed out with taxpayers’ money. The spread of corruption is difficult to control 
as corrupt operations are done in secrecy, while victims are not easily recognised (Peurala, 
2011:324). Organised corruption can bring the economy to a grinding halt and create artificial 
shortages that are then exploited for private economic gain. 
Corruption has service delivery implications. It causes municipalities and other government 
departments to waste and mismanage state funds (Myint, 2000:45). When municipalities 
embezzle and mismanage funds it becomes difficult to provide adequate services to the 
residents. This can trigger civil unrest. In developing countries, mismanagement, fraud and 
embezzlement of state funds is very common and mostly associated with very poor service 
delivery. In South Africa, for instance, service delivery in the townships is very poor and has 
recently caused unrest, with people throwing faeces at the public and passers-by (SAPA, 
2013:2). 
Corruption can lead to underground economic activities. Myint (2000:46) defines 
underground economic activities as those which involve illegal dealings such as the 
smuggling of drugs and tax evasion. In cases where the level of corruption is high, 
underground economic dealings flourish and promote more corrupt dealings that have the 
potential to accelerate lawlessness in a country. Another underground economic activity, 
Myint (2000:46) mentions, is the creation of the parallel market known as the black-market. 
The parallel market has the potential to concentrate wealth in the hands of the elite and their 
corrupt companions. In such conditions the poor remain very poor as life becomes difficult 
and it is expensive to pay for goods and services in the parallel market. In addition to an 
expensive life, the poor end up with distorted consumption patterns as they cannot afford to 
pay for goods and services in the parallel markets. 
Every country endeavours to have a society free from corruption and to create investment 
opportunities for all potential investors without distorting the rules of the game that are 
necessary for ideal and proper investment and conduct of business activities. Corruption 
distorts the ideal economic environment that attracts investors by forcing entrepreneurs to 
donate to charity as they try to maintain good public relations with government departments 
(Myint, 2000:48). Furthermore, corruption affects government revenue and expenditure as 
more projects are financed through corrupt deals. Apart from monetary costs the government 
incurs, Myint (2000:52) says corruption brings adverse constraints on the country’s capacity 
to undertake economic reforms as it involves a lack of transparency and accountability, and 
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distorts healthy competition as everything depends on the discretional powers of the public 
office bearers. Some good reforms are resisted by the very people who are supposed to 
implement these for the benefit of the majority. 
From the above discussion it is clear that there are many negative consequences which 
depend on the type of corruption taking place in a particular country. Although it is not 
correct to generalise the consequences of corruption as it can have various effects in different 
economies, it is also evident that developing and poor countries suffer more of these 
consequences than developed ones (Myint, 2000:48; Mauro, 1998:13; Uneke, 2010:112). 
Poor countries suffer the most as they do not have the means and capacity to deal with 
corruption and mostly rely on donations. Therefore developing countries need to prioritise the 
eradication of corruption in state enterprises in order to foster prosperity and development 
(Matsheza & Kunaka, 2001:19). Having made these observations, it is important to look at 
the possible solutions to the escalating challenges of corruption. 
2.3 Remedies for corruption  
Developing anti-corruption policies could be a way to address the increasing levels of 
corruption in the world. These could tap into the integrated approach designed by the UN’s 
Global Programme against Corruption (UNODCCP, 2001:17). The purpose of the integrated 
approach is to promote coordinated efforts in anti-corruption policies based on the following 
six pillars: 
 Democratic reforms. 
 A strong civil society with access to information and a mandate to oversee the state. 
 The presence of rule of law. 
 Increased checks and balances through the enhancement of the presence and balance 
between institutional accountability and independence, coupled with an increased 
public confidence in anti-corruption agencies. 
 New strategic national and international anti-corruption policies and measures. 
 New strategic national and international partnerships to develop joint strategies for the 
implementation of international and national anti-corruption policies and measures. 
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These six pillars are not only effective in reinforcing anti-corruption policies but, as revealed 
in countries where they have been piloted, they are also key for poverty reduction through 
quality growth, environment, education, health and governance (UNODCCP, 2001:17). 
UNODCCP further emphasises that policies must ensure that they are evidence-based, non-
partisan, as well as inclusive, integrated, comprehensive and impact oriented. A great deal of 
literature explains how key aspects of the integrated approach can produce anti-corruption 
policies that are also capable of addressing poverty. 
2.3.1 Evidence-based approach 
Reforms that are needed to curb corruption must include the voice of the people on whose 
behalf such policies are being implemented. This can be achieved by implementing reforms 
based on enough credible evidence to provide the users of such information with a strong 
base upon which to promote reforms for curbing corruption. According to the UNODCCP 
(2001:17), to provide meaningful and credible information for reforms there must be greater 
participation among service users such as in the customs’ services. All stakeholders in public 
office, including managers, government oversight agencies, the public and politicians must be 
involved in the evidence-based approach in designing, implementing and evaluating anti-
corruption policies. Uneke (2010:122) underscores the appropriate basics of reconstruction of 
institutional structure that underpin anti-corruption reforms such as setting well-designed 
rules through democratic processes which include popular participation, rule of law, 
accountability and transparency. Uneke (2010:122) also highlights the creation of an 
environment that encourages wealth creation and equitable allocation of public resources 
without depriving the mass of their basic human rights. Finally, corruption can be eliminated 
by creating an environment that limits opportunities for corrupt practices by enforcing strict 
and stiff punishment for corrupt offenders. 
Every reform intended to improve service delivery must be measured in terms of a bottom-up 
or top-down perspective which may avail indicators that are objective in nature and not just 
exceptional to curb corruption (UNODCCP, 2001:18). Before developing anti-corruption 
policies it is imperative to assess equity, effectiveness and efficiency of public services and to 
audit the resources that are lost through the systems gaps. Policies must be created in a 
climate of accountability and responsiveness which allow for a transparent environment, 
crucial for reducing corruption (UNODCCP, 2001:18). 
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2.3.2 The non-partisan approach 
Efforts to come up with a policy must also be apolitical since there will be long-term effects. 
Anti-corruption polices may straddle a number of administrations and, therefore, the 
formulation of anti-corruption strategies and objectives must be inclusive of different 
stakeholders without political agenda (UNODCCP, 2001:18). Anti-corruption policy 
formulations should take priority over party interests at all times to avoid conflict of interest. 
Myint (2000:55) argues that leadership plays a key role in combating corruption in a country 
by setting a good example in respect of honesty, integrity and capacity for hard work. In 
addition to this, leadership must exhibit firmness and extensive political willingness to 
implement reforms. Even though leadership’s commitment and willingness may not be 
enough to combat corruption, it needs to be complemented with other efforts such as 
credibility. Essentially, credibility is realised when offenders are publicly punished, without 
favour, based on the leadership position one holds in government (Myint, 2000:55). 
Prosecution of ‘big fish’ in the country is necessary to create a credible judicial set-up that 
gains the confidence of citizens. The DPSA (2005:13) asserts that, for the prosecution of 
corrupt offenders to be credible and effective, there must be prima facie proof as related to 
the revised legislation of South Africa. This ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ is important for 
the building of trust in the judicial system’s execution of anti-corruption corrective measures 
that can curb the abuse of power by, for instance, ruling party candidates. 
2.3.3 Transparency 
Transparency is a fundamental principle of good governance and a good antidote against 
corruption in an organisation (UNODCCP, 2001:18). Essentially, the public has the right to 
know about the activities in public offices. These activities should be displayed to create 
accessibility and the information made available in all languages where possible. When 
access to information for a decision-making process is readily available to citizens then 
accountability is achieved and this has the potential to reduce corruption (UNODCCP, 
2001:18). Among other things, transparency depends on the existence of freedom of the press 
which ensures that wrongdoers are publicised as a way of reducing corruption and promoting 
good governance (Lederman, Loayza & Reis Soares, 2001:9). For transparency to be realised 
there must be a responsible press in existence to gather, analyse, organise, present and 
disseminate information to people (Myint, 2000:55). For information to be available to the 
people, more investigative journalism is required to uncover secretive deals and deliver 
undistorted information. Investigative journalism is paramount to expose misconduct and acts 
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as a watchdog to minimise perpetrators’ chances of getting away with corruption (Myint, 
2000:55). It is therefore important to promote a responsible press that will create public 
awareness and expose corrupt activities without underestimating its power to curb this 
corruption. Other investigative services can also be useful in this regard, for instance, 
specialised anti-corruption units. 
2.3.4 Policy inclusivity  
Advocates of the integrated approach argue that national and international anti-corruption 
policies must be broad-based and inclusive of all people affected by corruption (UNODCCP, 
2001:19; Myint, 2000:55). This implies that inclusive participation that brings confidence to 
people has an effect on the reformation of anti-corruption processes. To bring corruption 
under control, ordinary citizens who have first-hand information on corruption need to be 
accorded the opportunity to participate in anti-corruption reforms (Myint, 2000:55). 
Successful reforms are those that include the marginalised by providing them with a voice 
and reinforcing the importance of their opinion (UNODCCP, 2001:19). Involving ordinary 
citizens builds confidence in government as sincere and genuine efforts to combat corruption 
are made possible. The UNODCCP (2001:19) outlines a coordinated strategic effort to 
develop and implement the international and national anti-corruption policies and measures 
that create trust between: 
 The three spheres of government which strengthen the checks and balances, 
developing trust and integrity to curb corruption. 
 Civic organisations whose responsibility it is to raise awareness about both 
perpetrators and victims of corruption in the fight against corruption. 
 International organisations and government entities from both developed and 
developing counties that can coordinate regulatory bodies and legal institutions to 
repatriate looted funds and offenders of corruption to their host countries. 
 Media to create awareness of the public on the corrupt officials, both internationally 
and nationally, and the exposure of funds stored in international banks. 
2.3.5 Integrated action plans 
The integrated approach assists good governance through coordinating the various goals and 
objectives from stakeholders such as the private and public sector using appropriate 
instruments to develop action plans for anti-corruption strategies (UNODCCP, 2001:19). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
 
These integrated approaches allow the citizens to take ownership of the objectives which are 
relevant to initiate reforms. 
2.3.6 Comprehensive approach in dealing with corruption 
A comprehensive approach is required when dealing with corrupt behaviour. The UNODCCP 
(2001:20) alludes to the propagation of many factors that create a corruption-free 
environment. UNODCCP (2001:20) further asserts that a corruption-free environment 
requires government to have good salaries to offset the basic needs of the people which can 
weaken them for rent seeking such as bribes. The three spheres of government must 
complement each other without interference of each other so as to maintain honesty and 
integrity within a country. 
2.3.7 Impact oriented goals and objectives 
For anti-corruption policies to achieve their goals and objectives, they must be developed to 
achieve realistic and achievable targets. Each policy must be well researched to ensure 
relevance and its capability to identify the appropriate indicators of anti-corruption that 
enable the implementation of reforms (UNODCCP, 2001:19). A policy must also create 
alternatives or choices of programmes that can provide the best impact on society.  
A well-researched policy should be able to address issues of corruption in the customs sector 
for instance. The following part of the theoretical framework will therefore focus on 
corruption in the customs environment, which is the main area of focus in this study. 
2.4 Corruption in the customs context 
Whereas the previous sections looked at corruption in the public sector in general, from this 
point onwards the chapter will look at issues specifically related to corruption in the customs 
sector. There are three common corruption practices here, namely the routine, criminal and 
fraudulent. A further explanation of the strategies to combat corruption within the customs 
context will be conducted.  
2.4.1 Types of corruption in customs 
The following are different types of corruption found in customs. Hors (2001:15) outlines 
three types of common corruption practices within the customs sector in general. The 
identified types of corruption are illustrated diagrammatically below: 







Figure 1: Identified forms of corruption at Customs Departments 
Drawing from the diagram, these forms of corruption will now be explained further. 
2.4.1.1 Routine corruption 
Routine corruption is a type of corruption committed by private operators through the paying 
of bribes to obtain favours or the quick completion of customs clearances during clearance 
procedures (Hors, 2001:14). This implies that traders must engage themselves in at least one 
of the categories of corruption to receive the service they require. The systems in the customs 
sector are manipulated to create corruption opportunities that lure traders into corruption 
(Hors, 2001:14). The more the traders are involved in exports and imports, the more customs 
procedures and processes are manipulated to suit the needs of traders. 
2.4.1.2 Fraudulent corruption 
This type of corruption occurs when operators avoid tax or pay less tax by not completing the 
customs clearance process. This type of corruption takes place between customs officials and 
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defined or recorded procedures. However, they have developed into a practical code that runs 
parallel to the regular customs procedures (Hors, 2001:14). 
2.4.1.3 Criminal corruption 
Criminal corruption occurs when operators pay bribes to permit an illegal lucrative operation 
such as drug trafficking and abuse of an export or promotional scheme, although this is not a 
common practice within the customs context (Hors, 2001:15). Hors (2001:15) further asserts 
that criminal corruption has been recorded in the developing countries’ customs departments. 
This type of corruption has to do with illegal trading. The criminal element suggests that it 
involves the trading of banned substances or substances that warrant prosecution if found. 
Another form of corruption indicated in Figure 1 above, which is different from others, is 
political corruption, explained below. 
2.4.1.4 Political corruption 
Politically motivated corruption may be used interchangeably with petty and administrative 
forms as it refers to a group of people or politicians who influence the laws and regulations 
that are set in their favour to extract undue economic or political gain (NORAD, 2009:41). 
Political corruption can range from the top political elite to lower level officials who grab 
opportunities created by loopholes in dubious laws and regulations enacted by politicians to 
receive undue economic gain from imports. 
Having noted these types of customs-related corruption, it is paramount to explain the causes 
of corruption in the customs context. Accordingly, the next segment elaborates on this.  
2.4.2 Causes of corruption in the customs context 
Studies that were carried out in other countries in the developing world such as Pakistan, the 
Philippines and Bolivia, discovered three common conditions that cause corruption within 
customs. These are: discretionary interface between the customs officers and the private 
operators; customs officers working within a network of accomplices; and a lack of efficient 
controls within customs (Hors, 2001:15). The common characteristics of developing 
countries motivate a generalisation of the observation that the cause of corruption would 
more or less be the same despite the varying laws of countries. Below is an explanation of the 
causes of corruption in the customs context. 
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2.4.2.1 Discretional interface 
Hors (2001:16) states that discretionary interface involves the customs officials who process 
a consignment on a discretion basis without the application of objective criteria that can limit 
an individual in miscalculation, undervaluation or misdeclaration for customs tax purposes. 
When customs officials are provided with an opportunity to use their own discretion, there 
are more chances of undervaluation or misdeclaration of customs duty in return for payments. 
Hors (2001:16) mentions examples of corruption resulting from the use of customs officials’ 
discretion to charge tax in the Philippines where a huge amount of corruption was recorded 
resulting from discretionary practices. 
2.4.2.2 Network of accomplices 
Customs officials create networks of accomplices through appointments and promotions 
based on bribery so as to form and maintain their network of corrupt activities within customs 
departments (Hors, 2001:16). Based on the former, it is evident that these networks of 
accomplices are developed through the recruitment, posting, transferring and promotion of 
junior customs officials through dubious means that are not based on merit and are 
purposefully meant to reinforce corrupt networks for the senior customs officials 
(Hors:2001:16). Such networking of corruption accomplices can be widespread given the 
improved accessibility of communication in developed countries.  
2.4.2.3 Lack of efficient and effective control 
Lack of efficient and effective control within the customs department creates opportunities 
for corrupt practices (Hors, 2001:16). There are organisational structures within the customs 
department with high positions, such as directors, who have no will to enforce the law, such 
as those ones found within the Pakistani customs unit (Hors, 2001:17). Cases of corruption 
were routinely incorrectly dealt with and abandoned without any indictments (Hors, 
2001:17). Cases that takes long to investigate end up being abandoned due to a lack of 
evidence. These cases are also constrained by Pakistani laws which are cumbersome (Hors, 
2001:17). There are laws and tax codes to outline sanctions imposed on illegal customs 
practices, but these are rarely applied (Hors, 2001:17). This lack of clearly monitored and 
evaluated policies and laws may result in cases wherein implementers of anti-corruption 
strategies are also the perpetrators. It is evident from the literature that the Pakistani 
government lacked the will and ability to address corruption because it affected the officials. 
The question is how can corruption be tackled given that the guard is the perpetrator? The 
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identified perpetrators in the Pakistan customs colluded with investigators to delay the 
investigations. 
2.4.2.4 Low salaries of customs officials  
The low salaries of customs officials are another cause of corruption in customs. Public 
servants are government employees who act or adjudicate any responsibility on behalf of the 
state (Hors, 2001:17). However, the low salaries of junior customs officials tempt them to 
engage in corrupt activities because it is difficult for them to live a reasonable standard of life 
(Hors 2001:17). When customs officials receive low salaries that do not meet their daily 
family needs, petty corruption becomes more common at customs. For instance, poverty 
becomes a driving force to solicit bribes from travellers. 
2.4.2.5 Social expectation 
Social expectation is another contributing factor to the cause of corruption within customs. 
Some senior management officials might flaunt their riches to junior officers who, in turn, are 
motivated to engage in corrupt activities (Hors, 2001:17). These junior officers operate on 
flawed instructions that advance their personal gains. It is incorrect to conclude that junior 
customs officials are drawn into corrupt activities only to fulfil their basic needs. When 
people have created some expectations an assumed standard of living is created which, if it 
fails to be realised through honest means, ends up in corrupt activities (Hors 2001:18). A 
perceived lifestyle such as a high standard of living may create a need that manifests itself 
into greed, thereby leading to corruption (NORAD, 2009:41). As the Warioba Commission 
argued, greed is motivated by the “wanting more and more” attitude. Officials need to live 
within their means, as anything beyond that may lead to corruption. 
Understanding the causes of corruption in customs without offering suggestions for remedies 
to these identified problems is not an adequate solution. Therefore it is prudent to elaborate 
on corruption remedies in the customs context. The following section of this chapter will 
discuss the solutions to the identified problems of corruption in customs in the form of anti-
corruption strategies. 
2.4.3 Customs-based anti-corruption strategies  
This part of the literature review relates to anti-corruption strategies in the customs context. 
Anti-corruption is a means of eradicating and campaigning against any form of dishonest or 
fraudulent conduct and includes detecting, preventing and combating graft and corruption 
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within an organisation such as in the public sector (GPG, 2009:7; Hors 2001:22; Kennedy, 
1999:456). The following strategies have been suggested as the possible solutions: 
compellingly educating role players about the negative impact of corruption on society; 
thoroughly understanding the causes and processes of corruption; devising incentives that are 
meant to discourage corruption; ensuring the proper implementation of anti-corruption 
measures; naming and shaming corrupt customs officials; and increasing democratic 
accountability through openness and transparency in government. These strategies will now 
be elaborated on separately. 
2.4.3.1 Educating role players about the negative impact of corruption on society 
Kennedy (1999:456) emphasises campaigning as a means to combat corruption. Anti-
corruption campaigns should ideally be accompanied by vigorous investigation which is 
transparent and respectful of civil rights. When corruption is investigated outside the 
jurisdiction of the respectful civil right, Kennedy (1999:457) argues, corrupt individuals tend 
to escape as they may be out of the scope of a campaign or a specific mandate which results 
in too many procedural costs.  
There are many examples of anti-corruption campaigns and these often depend on the type of 
department within which corruption takes place. According to Kennedy, prevention is better 
than punishment (Kennedy 1999:460). It is important that governments use preventative 
measures to eliminate corruption. The methods of prevention can include limiting the 
discretion in decision making of officials (Kennedy, 1999:462). The discretion of an 
individual to source a deal for an organisation or state opens opportunities for rent-seeking 
and normally these discretionary decisions are distorted in the shadow of both legal and 
illegal rules (Kennedy, 1999:462). The ACBPS (2010:11) sets some guidelines on the 
consequences of abuse of office which act as preventive measures for those who intend to 
engage in such corrupt activities. These guidelines include all forms of corrupt activities 
within customs departments. Providing employees with all different forms of corruption 
activities and their pernicious effects may prevent some from indulging in such activities. 
Forms of the effects of corruption must be made available to customs officials through 
awareness campaigns that showcase the victims and perpetrators. 
2.4.3.2 Educating role players about the negative impact of corruption on the economy 
Anti-corruption should involve campaigns on identifiable corrupt activities which have 
negative effects on economic performance (Kennedy, 1999:460). The anti-corruption 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 
 
campaigns should not only focus on ordinary citizens but should also include top government 
officials who may be deemed untouchable. The corruption committed by ordinary citizens 
may not have much detrimental effect compared to those committed by people in top 
government offices. There is a need to focus on all spectrums of society when dealing with 
corruption in customs. Eric and Melnikov (2011:2) outline ways of fighting corruption in 
various sectors of government. Firstly, combating corruption begins with individual myths 
that corruption is inseparable from tradition and culture; and secondly, it requires people to 
talk extensively about the adverse effects of corruption on society and the economy. When 
people have a meaningful understanding of how corruption can be detrimental to society it 
will consciously allow people to desist from engaging in corrupt activities as they may 
believe that it is against the moral behaviour of a society as stipulated in the ethics codes of 
their society (Shah, 2007:296). Shah (2007:296) further states that the customs department 
must have a clearly designed and spelt out ethics code on appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviour for all customs officials. When inappropriate behaviour is clearly spelt out, 
punishing those who are perpetrators of corruption becomes easier. When customs officials 
understand the principle of good leadership, which includes provisions on misuse of state 
property, accepting gifts disclosure, assets and liabilities (Shah, 2007:298; Eric & Melnikov, 
2011:2) it becomes easier to combat corruption. 
2.4.3.3 Strategies to understand the causes and processes of corruption 
These strategies involve identifying the root cause of corruption, where it originates and how 
it occurs (Eric & Melnikov, 2011:2). It is important to start by addressing the causes of 
corruption before the problem can be solved. The previous part of the discussion looked at 
the causes of corruption and their solutions in general. Hors (2001:24) argues that there is no 
need to establish control measures of corruption if those (customs officials) are not resistant 
to corruption. The literature suggests that the source of corruption is associated with the 
administration itself. If the administrator seeks bribery or creates bottlenecks for clients then 
the clients will approach customs with the mentality of bribing officials. When the source of 
corruption is detected, it is crucial to come up with a severe punishment for those involved. 
2.4.3.4 Strategies impacting on the change of incentives in order to discourage corruption 
Low incentives for customs officials were among the identified causes of corruption in the 
public. As a strategy to combat corruption, more positive incentives to officials should be 
awarded. Hors (2001:25) asserts that good rewards to customs officials are needed to offset 
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bribes and other forms of corruption that promote dishonesty among officials as these would 
lead them to value their pay more than bribes. 
2.4.3.5 Strategies to ensure proper implementation of anti-corruption measures 
Most countries have policies to address corruption but the problem is implementation. Eric 
and Melnikov (2011:4) are of the view that combating corruption is important in order for 
customs departments to implement anti-corruption policies that promote transparency and 
accountability, reinforcing internal controls within customs. These policies should include all 
stakeholders in the customs departments by coming up with a code that can be applied to 
corrupting and corrupt customs officials who participate, initiate or facilitate corrupt activities 
(Sosa, 1994:2). Sosa (1994:2) further believes that any conduct that can or may damage the 
image of customs should be punishable equally as corrupt activities. Everyone should be 
cautious of how they engage with customs officials as anything deemed corrupt would lead 
them to prosecution. 
2.4.3.6 Strategies to increase accountability and transparency in government 
Accountability and transparency are some of the core values of a democratic society. Studies 
have shown that democracy reduces corruption by 0.8 percent (Lederman, Loayza & Soares, 
2001.28). One can recognise such an assertion as true based on the principles of democracy 
such as freedom of the press which is the cornerstone of transparency. Therefore, democracy 
becomes a strategy of mitigating corruption as it promotes freedom of the press to expose any 
illicit dealings within the customs department. Arguably, the study may cast some doubt on 
the relationship between the level of democracy and the prevalence of corruption cases in 
South African government departments. South Africa has a better rating in terms of freedom 
of the press when compared to other African countries, although the African National 
Congress (ANC) government is still battling with corruption (GPG, 2009:7). In such 
situations democracy alone may not be enough to control and reduce corruption but the size 
of government may play a significant role (Lederman, Loayza & Soares, 2001:28). A reduced 
size of government from central government to local government reduces corruption. The 
effect is associated with the fact that monitoring at local government resources is closer to the 
citizens, unlike in central government (Lederman, Loayza & Soares, 2001.28). More 
important is the respect of the rule of law which has an effect on democracy, freedom of the 
press, stability of the country and the parliamentary system which has the capacity to combat 
corruption without interference (Lederman, Loayza & Soares, 2001:28). The link developed 
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between individuals and the state in creating political institutions which shape the balance of 
power, electoral processes and democracy determines the incentives of those in office. 
2.4.3.7 Strategies to detect, prevent and combat graft 
The Australia Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) (2010:5) outline how 
corruption is made known to officials. This is done through the confidential request and 
receipt of information from the public or employees. Hors (2001:22) also affirms that 
reinforcing investigations with a specialised enforcement team and intelligence would help to 
detect corruption within customs. Corruption must first be detected before proper anti-
corruption strategies can be defined. Verification of imported goods through an inspectorate 
directorate also assists in detecting corruption. Hors (2001:23) further explains how the 
Pakistani government managed to detect massive corruption within customs by appointing a 
totally different special inspection department on shipping services and these services 
deduced the abusive exercise of discretion by the customs officials. Spot checking by senior 
customs officials within the customs department is another strategy that reduces corruption 
and must be accompanied by rewards for those assisting in identifying culprits who commit 
corruption, and penalties for those found guilty should be enforced (Riley, 1998:4). Spot 
checking helps to detect graft (Theobald, in Riley, 1998:4). In essence this means that 
oversight bodies such as parliament portfolio committees and other anti-corruption agents can 
make unannounced roadblocks, inspections at border post and monitor the use of surveillance 
mechanisms to detect corrupt activities. 
2.4.3.8 Strategies that involve naming and shaming of corrupt customs officials 
Corrupt officials must be named and shamed without fear or favour. Riley (1998:5) 
emphasises such exposure of corrupt public officers as a helpful type of ant-corruption 
strategy. Public humiliation serves a fundamental role in curbing corruption. According to 
Riley (1998:5), the humiliation of public office bearers through purges, and making examples 
in quasi-official tribunals, are effective ways of curbing corruption if correctly mainstreamed 
in an array of mechanisms. Indeed, what is clear from the foregoing discussion is that a single 
strategy is not sufficient to combat corruption. Integrating different strategies is important. 




This chapter has explored the following issues raised in the literature review: 
 Definition of corruption: although several definitions exist, a common denominator is 
that corruption entails the abuse of one’s position in an organisation for personal gain. 
 Types of corruption: types of corruption are also as varied according the places where 
it occurs. Corruption takes many forms depending on its context. 
 Causes of corruption: similarly the causes of corruption are myriad. However, what 
can be restated here is that corruption is a result of inequalities in a society and weak 
institutional systems which makes it easy for various forms of corruption to occur. 
 Consequences of corruption: the consequences of corruption are also varied but 
perhaps the main thing is that it affects service delivery especially in developing 
countries. 
 Remedies for corruption: remedies can also be varied but most revolve around 
strengthening accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and transparency in the public 
service. 
 Types and causes of corruption in the customs context: it is possible to identify poor 
incentives and weak border control systems as the main, but by no means the only, 
contributors to corruption. 
 Customs-based anti-corruption initiatives: the use of technology, awareness 
campaigns and the improvement of controls systems and incentives are some of the 
key anti-corruption strategies that have been identified. 
In summary, what emerges from this literature is that successful anti-corruption strategies are 
those that are underpinned by democracy and good governance principles, including 
transparency and accountability. Without transparency and accountability, efforts to combat 
corruption will remain good only on paper. What also emerged from the foregoing literature 
review is that corruption is rooted in fundamental socio-economic and political issues as well 
as institutional weaknesses that exist in developing countries. Therefore, measures to combat 
corruption require anti-corruption strategies that address the root causes of corruption rather 
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than the corruption itself. All anti-corruption reforms need to be a double-edged sword that 
tackles both root causes and the empowerment of anti-corruption agencies.  
Another conclusion drawn from the literature is that most participants of corruption are 
beneficiaries and not victims. Theories still fail to capture the motive of corruption other than 
just explanation of subversion of law, betrayal of people’s trust and breach of contract. 
Corruption relates to the moral diversion from the set norms of the society more than just 
simply the breaking of laws. In the following chapter the researcher elaborates on corruption 
in Southern Africa and the legal framework in Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 3:  
Customs Corruption in Southern Africa: A Zimbabwe Case Study 
3.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to focus on customs corruption in Southern Africa, from a 
Zimbabwean case study perspective. This chapter begins by presenting a brief overview of 
customs in a Southern African context. The next segment will then focus on Zimbabwe as a 
role player within COMESA and SADC. This chapter is concluded by presenting a 
Zimbabwe case study to indicate how anti-corruption in Southern Africa customs manifests 
itself. 
3.2 Customs in Southern Africa 
Southern Africa is located in the southern hemisphere of the African continent. All countries 
in Southern Africa belong to a regional body known as the Southern African Development 
Committee (SADC). The SADC is a 15 member regional organisation consisting of the 
following countries: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, 
Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Madagascar and 
Tanzania. SADC was formed as a political regional grouping in 1980 with the aim of 
achieving the political liberation of Southern Africa. However, after the completion of the 
liberation agenda, the body morphed into an economic integration entity (Zembele, 2011:25; 
Maonera, 2007:9). According to the SADC, the regional body aimed to create a free trade 
area by 2008, Customs Union (CU) by 2010, a common market by 2015, Monetary Union by 
2016 and a single currency by 2018 (Zembele, 2011:25). The SADC objectives were not 
achieved due to, among other factors, divergent trade policy regimes by member states. 
However, tariffs are a major stumbling block. In South Africa they are used to protect 
domestic industry while other member states use it a source of government revenue 
(Zembele, 2011:25). The Zimbabwean situation should therefore be understood against this 
background. 
3.2.1 Zimbabwe as a role player in the Southern Africa customs 
Southern African countries, like other countries around the world, also belong to regional 
integration initiatives with a focus on trade agreements and tariff arrangements. This regional 
integration varies in form, for example, the Free Trade Area (FTA), Customs Union (CU), 
Common Market, Economic Union and the Political Union (Zembele, 2011:24). These 
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regional integrations aim to create rules on trade tariffs among member states (Zembele, 
2011:24). The issue of regional integration has recently created some controversy because of 
overlapping membership whereby most Southern African countries, except Mozambique, 
belong to at least two or more regional economic communities (RECs) (Maonera, 2007:5). 
These RECs include the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). Member states are criticised for belonging to two 
or more customs unions which creates cumbersome technical blockages since each customs 
union adopts regulations of commerce that are different from other customs unions and puts 
strain on member states’ resources as they have to implement two or more organisational 
programmes simultaneously (Maonera, 2007:6; Zembele, 2011:26).  
Zimbabwe, like most countries in Southern Africa, belongs to two customs unions; these are 
COMESA and SADC (Maonera, 2007:6; Zembele, 2011:26). The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) does not prohibit any country from belonging to two customs unions; however, 
caution is given particularly on the complication to maintain agreements of two common 
external tariffs (Zembele, 2011:26). Zembele (2011:26) further argues that a country 
belonging to two customs unions is required to meet the requirements of both customs unions 
and also to meet its obligations to third parties in the WTO. The decision as to which customs 
union a country can choose to belong to exclusively is not easy as this has political and 
economic implications for member states (Maonera, 2007:6; Zembele, 2011:26). Zimbabwe 
is criticised for its dual customs union memberships, hence it is recommended to stick to the 
SADC customs union (Maonera, 2007:6). The implications of Zimbabwe being in SADC are 
that the region already has existing agreements that make it more convenient for trade. There 
will be less controversies relating to the saving of two agreements at a time. It is, however, 
important to stick to trade agreements that are beneficial and favourable to Zimbabwe. 
A close analysis of Zimbabwe’s customs tariff objectives indicates that they are more closely 
related to those in the COMESA than in the SADC customs union. According to Maonera 
(2007:6) and Zembele (2011:26), trade tariffs in SADC member states have different 
objectives. For example, South Africa uses tariffs to protect its industry while in Zimbabwe 
tariffs are used as a source of government revenue. Therefore, given such different tariff 
objectives among SADC member states it will be difficult to agree on external tariffs. 
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Due to different levels of development within Southern Africa, member states pursue 
different policy objectives on customs tariffs and this slows down the regional integration 
process as some agreed integration may cause conflict with particular national interests 
(Maonera, 2007:7; Zembele, 2011:28). However, given Zimbabwe’s economic level of 
development, belonging to the SADC customs union alone may not benefit the country 
sufficiently. Zembele (2011:29) argues that poorer member states will not benefit from 
deeper integration with countries whose development level is higher than Zimbabwe such as, 
for instance, South Africa. 
As a result of these complex hoops and divergent interests, trade across countries in Southern 
Africa has remained subject to complex tariff regimes that are fertile ground for corruption. 
The next segment elaborates on this issue.  
3.3 Corruption in the Southern Africa customs context: A Zimbabwe case study 
3.3.1 Background 
Customs corruption has been rife in southern Africa and Zimbabwe, and it mirrors the forms 
discussed earlier in this thesis. The existence of corruption has motivated most SADC 
countries to take a common stance to combat corruption using extended jurisdiction based on 
regional cooperation (Zvekic, 2002:35). Regional agreements allow member states to 
extradite offenders of corruption from themselves. The legislation requires member states of 
SADC to recognise that corruption is an extraditable offence as articulated in the protocol 
objective 2 (Zvekic, 2002:35). Zvekic further states that most SADC countries already have 
laws that allow for the extradition of corrupt officials, particularly on drug trafficking, using 
either signed treaties or designated states. The idea of combating corruption using uniform 
norms to deal with offenders may not escape challenges such as disparities with respect to 
extradition and sentences (Zvekic, 2002:36). 
SADC countries also have the opportunity to embark on mandatory promulgation of the 
subordinate legislation within the framework of the region. In essence, all member states are 
required to achieve the objective of article 3 of the protocol through a common 
implementation strategy to deal with corruption (Zvekic, 2002:36). The SADC has a 
committee that is tasked with monitoring the implementation of laws meant to combat 
corruption. For implementation to take place, member states are required to align their laws 
with the SADC protocol. Being a member of state of SADC, Zimbabwe has also set its 
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customs procedures on dealing with corruption in line with SADC protocols. The next part of 
the chapter will focus on the Zimbabwean customs context. 
3.3.2 Zimbabwe in the customs context: an overview 
Zimbabwe customs is under the administration of the ZIMRA, which is in turn administered 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance. This organisation (ZIMRA) was formed in 
2001 and it succeeded the Department of Taxes, Customs and Excise which used to be run 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and Home Affairs (Matamande et al., 2012:2). 
The organisation was set up after the enactment of the Revenue Authority Act (RAA) on 
February 11, 2000 (ZIMRA, 2013:2). The Commissioner General, Mr Gershem T. Pasi, was 
appointed and the ZIMRA became fully functional on 1 September 2001. 
The ZIMRA now takes pride in successfully facilitating the widening of the tax base by 
streamlining tax expenditure, minimising revenue leakages and enhancing trade facilitation 
through smooth and quick clearance of goods and travellers (Matamande, et al., 2012:2). To 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the ZIMRA’s facilitation role, more temporary 
and permanent staff has been employed, and more stations have been opened across border 
posts. In order to improve compliance with clients the authority has policies, regulations and 
institutions in place that guide the organisational mandate. 
The ZIMRA endeavours to minimise tax leakages through internal controls. These controls 
are achieved through proper administration of the ZIMRA customs department and a huge 
investment in software technology (ZIMRA Bulletin, 2013:2). The introduction of different 
software technology is paramount for the detection of smuggling and quick clearance of 
clients and travellers. Despite the huge investment in software technology, the ZIMRA still 
encounters leakages within the organisation such as the undervaluing of vehicles or alteration 
of customs documents by some ZIMRA employees (Harare24 News, 2013:1). It must, 
however, be asked what policies, regulations and institutions are available within the ZIMRA 
Customs Department to combat corruption. These will be explored in the next section. The 
ZIMRA as a state agent implements policies enacted by government to combat corruption. It 
is also important to take cognisance of those policies and institutions that operate within the 
customs department specifically, as well as those that are independent of the ZIMRA but are 
still used by this organisation as they are state law enforcement agents.  
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3.3.2.1 Customs corruption: The policy context 
Like many organisations, the ZIMRA has a set of policies that guide its operations, including 
anti-corruption measures. Although the specific anti-corruption policy documents were not 
shared with the researcher for use in this study, the ZIMRA website provides some insight 
into the values that would be used as guidelines for policy formulation. The ZIMRA spells 
out its three core values as integrity, transparency and fairness. The organisation’s client 
charter says that: 
 We shall conduct our business within the confines of the law. 
 We do not tolerate smuggling, tax evasion, corruption, favouritism and 
discrimination. 
These policy ideals are strongly influenced by public ethics. However, in reality the political 
and public agendas of certain regimes may create flaws in the development and 
implementation of institutional policies. When developing institutional policies, the internal 
and external controls, probity and transparency should be priorities and must involve a 
proactive and participatory political discourse (Miguel, 2007:4). In essence a policy needs to 
be inclusive of all of the stakeholders that will be affected. Policies are internal control 
systems crafted by the management of an organisation with the primary objective to ensure 
that the organisation operates flawlessly (Puttick 2001, cited in Matamande, et al., 2012:2). 
Whether the ZIMRA has fully achieved these values is a point for further discussion. 
However, the ZIMRA is not a law enforcement agent although it can discipline employees 
who are found guilty of corruption. The ZIMRA therefore depends on a number of 
institutions whose primary mandate is to expose and curb corruption. These are covered 
below. 
3.3.2.2 Customs corruption: llegislative framework 
Section 194 (1)(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe stipulates that, “Services must be 
provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias”. In addition, Section 194 (1)(h) 
stipulates that “transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible 
and accurate information”. These provisions are the backbone of public institutional integrity 
and ethical conduct. In addition to these constitutional provisions, the Customs and Excise 
Act 22 of 2001, in particular Section 181, also has specific provisions that legislate against 
customs-related corruption such as fraud, conniving, and soliciting bribes. The constitutional 
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framework provides for the establishment of several institutions that are central to the fight 
against corruption. Together with other non-state institutional actors, these are discussed in 
the following segment. 
3.3.2.3 Customs corruption: Anti-corruption institutions 
Zimbabwe has the following legal entities and institutional formations involved in the fight 
against corruption: 
 The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) 
 Civil Service Commission 
  Civic Society Organisations 
 The media 
 The National Prosecuting Authority 
 The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) 
The role played by these anti-corruption agencies in the fight against corruption in Zimbabwe 
will be discussed in detail hereunder: 
3.3.2.4 The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) 
The ZRP is the police service in Zimbabwe which is expected to play a crucial role in 
combating corruption. The Zimbabwe Republic Police functions regarding how the unit 
strategically combats corruption are outlined in the Constitution. Section 203(1)(a) of the 
Zimbabwean Constitution gives provision to the ZRP for powers to detect, investigate and 
prevent crime, including corruption. Police will investigate any suspected form of crime in 
every organisation, including the Customs Department. The ZRP investigates a range of 
crimes including corruption and bribery. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID), a 
unit of the ZRP, has been particularly crucial in investigating corruption. Other units such as 
the Support Unit (SU) and Border Control Unit (BCU) have also been crucial in investigating 
crime, or are at least required to be so. 
3.3.2.5 The Civil Service Commission (CSC) 
The Civil Service Commission is also expected to play an important role in combating 
corruption by carrying out its mandate to investigate, monitor and evaluate the organisation 
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and administration of the civil service, including the ZIMRA. CSC is also tasked with 
promoting good governance within the civil service through the administration and 
implementation of particular policies and standards. Section 203 of the Constitution allows 
the Civil Service Commissioners to appoint qualified personnel to carry out the duties of the 
civil service without compromising the integrity of the department. It is also important to 
note that the Civil Service Commission, through its vested powers as recorded in Section 
203(d) of the Constitution, can institute an investigation or remedy any grievances among 
members of the public service. The CSC has the power to carry out disciplinary hearings in 
the event that one of its members breaches its rules by engaging in corruption within the civil 
service. Section 25(1) of the Public Service Act 17 of 2002 provides for the disciplinary 
measures that can be adopted in cases involving misconduct or suspected misconduct on the 
part of member of the public service. Section 25(2) provides guidelines on the procedures to 
be followed in the investigation and adjudication of misconduct as prescribed in the service 
regulation. 
The CSC is responsible for the management of conflict of interest within the government. 
Section 203(f) of the Constitution stipulates that members of the civil service must carry out 
their duties efficiently and impartially. The CSC cuts across all government departments in 
carrying out its mandate as stipulated in section 199(1) of the Constitution. Guided by the 
mandate of the CSC, all government ministries and departments are subject to the policies 
and regulations of the commission. Section 203(a) provides the CSC with powers to override 
grievance procedures of other departments as long as the cases under focus involve a civil 
servant. All public administration policies of government departments are embodied in 
section 194 of the Constitution which stipulates, among other things, a high standard of 
professional ethics, transparency, accountability and diversity. The professional ethics 
mentioned create frameworks from which the CSC can prosecute members when non-
compliance is discovered within the government department. 
3.3.2.6 Civic societies 
Civic society organisations have the oversight role in a country. Among other things, 
advocacy, research and civic education awareness campaigns are their core functions (GPAC, 
2001:61). Civic societies include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media, 
professional associations and research institutes such as universities. In Zimbabwe, the Anti-
Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (ACT-SA) is a non-governmental organisation that was 
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formed in 2004 to campaign against corruption and to promote good governance (ACT-SA, 
2012:1). ACT-SA envisages its intervention programmes within the following four areas:  
 Advocacy for anti-corruption policy and law reforms: the advocacy for anti-corruption 
policies and laws aims to give aid to the NGO on the formulation, implementation and 
coordination of the anti-corruption laws and policies. 
 Social prevention and community empowerment: the goal here is to provide effective 
empowerment mobilisation and monitoring of the organisational integrity of service 
providers. 
 Institutional capacity building: the aim is to capacitate the anti-corruption agents on 
the prevention and combating of corruption. 
 Research and development: the aim of this focus area is to conduct research, collect 
information and codify the knowledge on how to prevent and combat corruption as 
well as promote good governance. 
The aim of ACT-SA endeavours has been to root out corruption from all angles through 
different methods such as those cited above. The effectiveness of ACT-SA depends on its 
implementation by the relevant authorities as well as being complemented by the 
Zimbabwean laws. 
Civic organisations in Zimbabwe do not operate in isolation; they complement each other. 
Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI-Z) is another civic organisation operating on anti-
corruption matters in Zimbabwe. TI-Z is a registered non-governmental organisation in 
Zimbabwe which devotes attention to issues of transparency and good governance, and 
antidotes against corruption (Doig, 2006:71). Their special mandate is to fight corruption and 
related vices through networks of integrity in line with global strategy. TI-Z has recently 
intensified its strategy against corruption by creating an SMS hotline (+263775220700) to 
expose and report on any form of corruption (Kubatana, 2005:1). In addition to the SMS 
hotline, TI-Z has also introduced the National Integrity System (NIS), the brainchild of 
Jerome Pope, which develops a more holistic perspective by identifying institutions with 
different roles in the struggle against corruption. NIS encourages institutions to address their 
own vulnerability to corruption and assesses their combined efforts in combating corruption 
(Doig, 2006:71). 
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3.3.2.7 The media 
The media plays a fundamental role in exposing corruption in Zimbabwe. Among other 
things, the media provides the anti-corruption institutions with a whistle-blowing role. The 
media helps to expose corruption through investigative journalism and the reporting of 
corrupt dealings within different sectors in Zimbabwe (Myint, 2000:55). What is implied here 
is that media is a watchdog and whistle-blower for hidden corruption. In a number of cases, 
anti-corruption agencies instigate investigations after reports in the media. Therefore media 
exposure plays a pivotal role in anti-corruption strategies. 
3.3.2.8 The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
The National Prosecuting Authority provides a legal framework and capabilities for the 
prosecution of criminals such as those officials who engage in corrupt deals. Section 258 of 
the Constitution provides for the establishment of the NPA whose responsibility it is to 
institute and prosecute on behalf of the state, as well as discharge any other duties as defined 
in the Constitution. The NPA is headed by the Prosecutor General (PG) who, according to 
section 259(3), is appointed by the president on advice of the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC). It is important to note that the Prosecutor General has the constitutional powers to 
direct the Commissioner of Police to investigate and report to him/her on any matter related 
to alleged offences. The Anti-Corruption Commission has the constitutional mandate to refer 
matters to the NPA (Section 255(f) of the Constitution). The function of the NPA must be 
exercised impartially, without fear, favour, prejudice or bias (section 260(1)(b) of the 
Constitution). 
3.3.2.9 The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) 
Section 254 of the Zimbabwe Constitution provides for the establishment and composition of 
the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission. The Commission is appointed by the president 
and comprises at least four persons of integrity drawn from the ranks of accountants, lawyers 
and experts with experience in investigative work or prosecution. 
3.3.2.9.1 The objectives of ZACC 
The main objective of the commission is to promote the investigation of serious cases related 
to corruption and fraud (Anti-Corruption Commission Act 13 of 2004). This is reinforced by 
the Prevention of Corruption Act which provides designated investigators with the power to 
question any specified person associated with any form of corruption (Prevention of 
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Corruption Act 15 of 1994). The second objective of the Anti-Corruption Act is to develop 
proposals related to anti-corruption in both public and private sectors (Anti-Corruption 
Commission Act 13 of 2004). These objectives form the bedrock of the mandate of the 
ZACC. 
3.3.2.9.2 Mandate of the ZACC  
The mandate of the Commission is derived from the provisions of the Constitution as well as 
in the Anti-Corruption Act. The Anti-corruption Act gives the Commission a three-
dimensional approach in the fight against corruption, including public education, corruption 
prevention and finally investigation and prosecution. Public education involves creating 
public awareness about all aspects of corruption in Zimbabwe, whilst corruption prevention 
deals with all measures that are taken to prevent corruption. The investigation and 
prosecution mandate involves investigating all reported cases on corruption and the 
prosecution of offenders of corruption in the courts. In short, the ZACC has the following 
mandate: 
 To promote honesty, financial discipline and transparency in the public and private 
sector; 
 to receive and consider complaints from the public and to take such action in regard to 
the complaints as the Commission considers appropriate; 
 to direct the Commissioner-General of Police to investigate cases of suspected 
corruption and to report to the Commission on the results of any such investigation; 
 to refer matters to the National Prosecuting Authority for prosecution; 
 to require assistance from members of the police service and other investigative 
agencies of the state; and 
 to make recommendations to the government and other persons on measures to 
enhance integrity and accountability and prevent improper conduct in the public and 
private sectors. 
These mandates guide the functions of the Commission accordingly. 
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3.3.2.9.3 Functions of the ZACC 
Section 255(91) of the new Constitution outlines the functions of the Zimbabwe Anti-
Corruption Commission which includes the investigation and exposure of cases of corruption 
in the public and private sectors. The means of exposing these cases of corruption depends on 
the provisions of the departmental policy. Based on the former, Section 13 of the Anti-
Corruption Commission Act of 2004 extends provisions of the ZACC to appoint itself or an 
agent to exercise powers concurrently with those of the police to investigate or search any 
person(s) or organisation suspected of corruption. Having noted these important umbrella 
issues it is important to turn to an overview of corruption cases at the Zimbabwe customs at 
Beitbridge Border Post and pave the way for a fuller analysis in the next chapter. 
3.4 Customs corruption in the Zimbabwe: Current realities 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country whose trade facilities depend on neighbouring countries 
such as South African and Mozambique that have coastlines. However, Zimbabwe also acts 
as a gateway for other landlocked countries such as Zambia. This has created severe 
congestion at the country’s border posts such as the ones in Beitbridge and Chirundu. 
Traders/trucks can take about 36 hours to be cleared (AFDB, 2010:8). The slow process of 
clearance of traders and trucks by customs officials have been linked to both outdated 
customs clearance services and frequent allegations of corruption (The Zimbabwe Papers, 
2009:25). According to The Zimbabwe Papers (2009:30), Zimbabwe is ranked 168th out of 
175 countries in terms of time taken to clear goods and services through a port of entry. A 
congested port of entry makes customs officials work under pressure. This also frustrates 
cross-border traders who then succumb to pressure and end up resorting to attempts that may 
help bypass the formal procedures and rule of law of customs control. A variety of corruption 
tendencies develop and nourish each other in such conditions. 
The most common problems in the customs department involve money laundering. 
Goredema (2007:48) defines money laundering as when a person or individual directly or 
indirectly engages in a transaction inside or outside the country by moving money through 
illegal channels. In essence, in customs contexts this involves the illegal trans-territorial 
transactions of money that are done beyond the confines of the law. The existence of money 
laundering at the border is a result of the failure of law enforcement agents to detect and 
control such activities. Despite the arrests of some money laundering culprits, according to 
Goredema (2007:55) these efforts have been negatively impacted by cases of detention of 
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suspects without bail, only to be released later for a lack of evidence. Another reason why 
suspects are not prosecuted is that corrupt institutions and officers tend to connive with 
culprits who then manage to avoid punitive provisions of the law (Goredema, 2007:28). 
Corrupt institutions provide a flourishing environment for money laundering. False 
declaration of goods and currency is another serious problem that exists at the border. 
ESAAMLG (2007:154) laments the lack of “water tight control” systems such as electronic 
currency transaction registers that are capable of combating corruption at ports of entry. Lack 
of compliance with the specific ZIMRA guidelines concerning the freezing of detected 
money laundering opens opportunities for corruption. 
Existing conditions generally allow frontline officers a measure of leeway which has 
contributed to the problem of abuse of procedures in customs (Igbanugo, 2012:3). For 
instance, whenever the frontline officers are given discretionary powers to decide on the 
amount of customs duty to be charged on imported goods, officers end up inflating prizes so 
that they reach targets or may solicit bribes for lower taxes charges. 
These loopholes have proved to be deleterious due to, for instance, the increase in 
containerised trade. Igbanugo (2012:3) asserts that containerisation has increased by ten 
percent every year while the country lags behind in terms of efficiency, capacity and customs 
infrastructure that can carter for high volumes of traders. The high volumes of traders create 
congestion at Beitbridge, Plumtree and Chirundu border posts that lead to pressure on the 
customs officials who then manipulate laws and procedures to meet their targets (Igbanugo, 
2012:3). Igbanugo further alludes to low educational levels of exporter and importer brokers 
who allow customs officials to manipulate laws and procedures of tax to extort fees for 
private gain. 
Lack of fully operational automated systems have weakened the crucial tools for transparency 
in tax and duty assessment thereby affecting the speed of customs clearance at the port of 
entry (Igbanugo, 2012:8). Manual processing of customs and tax at the port of entry reduces 
efficiency and effectiveness as officers use manual facilities to clear clients. Despite the bill 
of entry which is processed in the ASYCUDA system, its efficiency is still questionable as 
most of the customs officials are not knowledgeable about how to service huge volumes of 
cross-border traders at ports of entry (ZIMRA, 2013:3). Igbanugo (2012:10) quotes a 
respondent who said, “you bribe customs and prosper or you stick to the ethical principles 
and perish”. Such a response indicates the extent to which bribery has infused itself into the 
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customs officials and travellers. Corruption has created vertical ties of patronage which 
undermine the legitimate implementation of rules of law and policies within customs 
departments (Igbanugo, 2012:11). The politics of who-you-know has overshadowed the 
meritocratic recruitment, appointment and promotion which further reinforce the ties of 
patronage within the border post in Zimbabwe (Igbanugo, 2012:12). The ties of patronage 
emanate from the kinship and community of origin of customs officers who are believed to 
help them, and failure to do so is deemed foolish and selfish by relatives (Igbanugo, 
2012:12). It goes further in enhancing corruption as the ties with friends and family are used 
to network patronage of corruption. According to Igbanugo (2012:12), customs officials, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, have created networks made up of family and 
acquaintances that are based on trust and reciprocity as a means of reserving goodwill for the 
future. It is important to note that Zimbabwe customs is not spared of such networks of 
corruption and patronage. In short, as enunciated by Igbanugo (2012:13), such endemic forms 
of corruption have the following negative effects or costs: 
 Inefficiency of the customs officers at the border post create long queues that 
enable and necessitate the soliciting of bribes. 
 Bribes are used to evade tariffs, protect cargo on the docks and avoid costly 
storage fees. Based on these, the state loses revenue from customs duty and 
storage. Bribes also contribute to the escalation of corruption and congestion as 
more traders crowd the border. 
 Corruption at one point of entry such as Beitbridge leads traders to divert their 
routes to less corrupt borders which increases the traffic to one border post and 
increases the transport of traders. 
The section above elaborated on the current realities of corruption at Beitbridge Border Post. 
It emerged that the ZIMRA at Beitbridge Border Post is not spared from corruption in 
revenue leakage which impact negatively on Zimbabwe’s dwindled budget. The following 
part of the thesis will elucidate the controls that aim to eradicate corruption. 
3.5 ZIMRA customs: internal control at borders 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the reason the ZIMRA was formed is to collect revenue for 
the Zimbabwean government and to make sure leakages are closed (ZIMRA, 2013:1). The 
organisation envisages expediting trade by making sure that measures are put in place to 
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control the movement of goods and services. The ZIMRA has implemented measures to 
reduce leakages through the segregation of duties, such as the strict authorisation of goods 
passing the border post, use of security personnel and technology for body searches, 
supervision of personnel and deployment of workstations thereof. Another control policy is 
the recruitment of customs officials involving background checks of each potential employee 
to avoid conflict of interest. This will be elaborated on later in the thesis. What needs to 
emphasised presently is that the ZIMRA initiatives are largely dependent on the 
constitutional provisions of the country and its statutory organs. Based on this understanding, 
it is paramount to look at the Zimbabwean Constitution and particularly how it seeks to 
address corruption. 
3.6 Summary  
The successful fight against corruption by the ZIMRA would depend on the degree of 
effectiveness among institutions that lie within the three arms of government, namely the 
legislature, executive and judiciary. However, the political environment in Zimbabwe has 
discredited the operational integrity and independence of the judiciary. The fight against 
corruption requires coordinated anti-corruption strategies and, without cohesion of policy, 
there is the danger of duplication of efforts that will translate to the waste of resources. The 
next chapter focuses on a case analysis framework. 
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Chapter 4: Corruption in the Zimbabwean Customs System: A 
Beitbridge Case Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 provided a description of the Southern Africa customs situation with a particular 
focus on Zimbabwean customs. The chapter further elaborated on the legislative, institutional 
and policy framework within the Zimbabwean customs context and provided the context 
within which corruption takes place in locations such as Beitbridge. The goal of this present 
chapter (Chapter 4) is to give a detailed explanation of the specific examples and 
consequences or implications of corruption in the ZIMRA customs. The second goal is to 
analyse how these cases either contravened the law or the ZIMRA policies. The third goal is 
to assess the role of the relevant anti-corruption institutions in curbing corruption at the 
border. The chapter goes on to suggest possible remedies for corruption within the ZIMRA in 
general, and at Beitbridge Border Post in particular.  
This chapter depends on sets of documentary data accumulated from a variety of sources 
including the ZIMRA bulletin of 2012/2013, Harare24.com, TradeMark Southern Africa, The 
Herald, Nehanda Radio online news bulletins, Bulawayo24News, and 
Zimbabweelection.com. As it is very clear, most of these are media sources containing 
reported cases of corruption at the border. Cases covered in these sources are described and 
analysed for compliance with both the ZIMRA policies and other existing legislative 
frameworks. Specifically, these cases will be tested against the Customs and Excise Act 22 of 
2001, which guides the ZIMRA’s customs operations, and also against the client charter of 
the ZIMRA. This is done in order to illustrate the existence of corruption at Beitbridge, which 
is a key aspect of this research, as well as the norms and standards being breeched. As has 
already been indicated earlier in the thesis, the media plays a crucial role in exposing 
corruption and, for this thesis in particular, the media has been a key source of credible data. 
4.2 Analysis of corruption cases at the ZIMRA customs at Beitbridge Border 
Post 
This section will discuss the analysis of data in respect of the cases of corruption that were 
identified at the ZIMRA customs at the Beitbridge Border Post. The evidence obtained will 
be later compared with applicable legislation and policies to ascertain whether the current 
status of the ZIMRA customs is in compliance or not. 
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4.2.1 Undervaluing of goods 
Cases of the undervaluing of goods have been found to be prevalent at the country’s border 
posts. Several media outlets have covered a variety of such cases which have occurred at 
Beitbridge Border Post. These reports cover some cases that occurred quite recently, in 2013, 
and illustrate the watchdog position held by the media. Examples are covered below. 
4.2.1.1 A case of the undervaluing of imported second-hand Japanese vehicles: description 
and analysis 
On 8 October 2013, several national and online news media such as The Herald, Business 
Daily and Harare24.com reported on the investigation of four ZIMRA revenue officers who 
were involved in corrupt deals relating to the undervaluing of imported second-hand Japanese 
cars and the alteration of customs documents in order to enable some car dealers to pay less 
excise duty. These unnamed officers were working in collaboration with car dealers from 
Harare and Bulawayo. One of the ZIMRA officers involved had been issued with a warning. 
It was discovered that these officers would change car manufacturing dates in order to 
facilitate a lesser excise levy. According to press reports, the anomaly was discovered by one 
of the ZIMRA officials monitoring the ASYCUDA data who discovered that the vehicle 
model and manufacturing date entered did not match. Harare24.com also reported an earlier 
case of three ZIMRA officers who were suspended in early 2013 on allegations of corruption 
relating to the facilitation of the smuggling of undeclared goods into the country. However, it 
is not clear what the fate of these culprits involved in the vehicle scam was. This could not be 
ascertained because of the challenges encountered in accessing such data from the ZIMRA as 
it was deemed confidential. However, as indicated below, what is very clear is that these 
officers contradicted both the law and ZIMRA customs policies. 
4.2.1.2 Compliance with the law 
When analysed in terms of the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 2, this case can 
be categorised under the violation of law perspective because it entails deviation from a set of 
laws and standards. The customs officers in question violated the Customs and Excise Act 22 
of 2001, in particular Section 181 which stipulates that, “If any officer directly or indirectly 
asks for or takes, in connection with any of his duties in terms of this Act, any payment or 
other reward whatsoever pecuniary or otherwise, not being a payment or reward that he is 
lawfully entitled to claim or receive, or enters into acquiesces in any agreement to do, or 
abstain from doing, permit, conceal or connive at any act or thing whereby the state is or may 
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be defrauded or which is otherwise unlawful, being an act of thing relating to the 
administration of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence”. Clearly, these customs officers had 
colluded with car dealers to deprive the state of its due revenues, and had in the process also 
received payments (bribes) not due to them. 
In addition, altering the customs information to allow car dealers to pay less customs duty is a 
violation of the CSC policy as contemplated in Section 203 of the Constitution which 
stipulates that public office bearers must carry out duties of the civil service without 
compromising the integrity of an organisation or its set down procedures. Furthermore, this 
case violated ZIMRA norms and standards, as indicated below. 
4.2.1.3 Compliance with the ZIMRA customs policy 
This case can be further analysed in terms of the breach of duty theory which focuses on the 
failure of the public official to honour the organisation’s code of conduct, regulations and 
policies. The customs officers involved in the fraudulent case described above did not comply 
with the ZIMRA’s core values of integrity, transparency and fairness, as enshrined in the 
Client Charter of the ZIMRA. Moreover, as indicated in this Charter, the ZIMRA promises to 
“conduct business within the confines of the law” and to “carry out duties professionally, 
diligently and courteously” (ZIMRA, n.d.). It is also possible to add the betrayal of public 
trust as contemplated in the public interest theory, which focuses on the behaviour of officers 
bent on fulfilling personal interests at the expense of citizens. 
4.3 A case of assisted smuggling: description and analysis 
On 4 June 2013, the Bulawayo24News reported that the ZIMRA had suspended three 
revenue officers for helping people smuggle a variety of goods into the country in 
contravention of the law (Bulawayo24, 2013). The case was also reported by the country’s 
main daily newspaper, The Herald, on 3 June 2013. The three officers, Kudakwashe Mutasa 
(Supervisor Bonds), Lina Chipitiri and Silibaziso Mtetwa (both revenue officers) were found 
to have connived with traders to smuggle bales of clothing using counterfeit documentation. 
The accomplices had also been involved in smuggling cases involving cross-border bus crews 
who were able to smuggle a variety of goods into the country. The value of the goods which 
were discovered by the anti-smuggling team was set at $8,000. One of the accomplices had 
released impounded vehicles against the instructions of the anti-smuggling unit. Hove 
(2013:7) explains smuggling as a way of evading tax. He further alludes to the high volumes 
of impounded vehicles and other electric goods at Beitbridge Border Post as an indication 
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that there is high incidence of smuggling. This case fails the compliance tests, as indicated 
below. 
4.3.1 Compliance with the law  
Similar to the first case, when analysed in terms of the theoretical perspectives presented in 
Chapter 2, this case can be categorised under the violation of law perspective because it 
entailed deviation from a set of laws and standards. Section 183 of the Customs and Excise 
Act of 2001 prohibits the smuggling of goods. According to this section of the Act, “Any 
person who smuggles any goods shall be guilty of an offence”. Since these cases of 
smuggling were facilitated by the ZIMRA revenue officers at the Beitbridge Border Post, it 
means that they were accomplices in the smuggling crime, and this constitutes corruption. 
Also, this act contradicts the ZIMRA policies as indicated below. 
4.3.2. Compliance with the ZIMRA customs policy 
In addition, this case can be further assessed in terms of the breach of duty theory which 
underscores the failure of a public official to honour the code of conduct, regulations and 
policies of an organisation. The ZIMRA policy procedures enshrined in the Client Charter 
clearly stipulates that the organisation does not “tolerate smuggling, tax evasion, favouritism, 
discrimination” (ZIMRA, n.d.). Clearly, these officers connived with smugglers and, in so 
doing they did not only break the law but also failed to uphold the ZIMRA standards and 
values about integrity, honesty and transparency. In addition, they breached the trust 
bestowed on them by the public. 
4.4 Analysis of research conducted in 2012 on smuggling 
Research that was conducted in 2012 revealed that 80% of respondents agreed that there is 
rampant smuggling at Beitbridge Border Post and only 20% disagreed (Hove, 2013:6). The 
research indicates that smuggling is one of the most common forms of corruption happening 
at this post. According to Hors (2001:15) such corruption is referred to as criminal as it 
involves the importation of either banned goods or the forging of customs documents. 
4.4.1 Compliance with the law 
Smuggling is a criminal act and it is not corruption. However, allowing smuggling to take 
place in the presence of security personnel and baggage scanners is a violation of the 
requirements for the legal importation/exportation of goods is corruption. Not using scanners 
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indicates non-compliance with the Anti-Corruption Act Section 13 of 2004 (1)(i) which 
prohibits the smuggling or unlawful export or import of goods. 
4.4.2 Compliance with the ZIMRA ccustoms policy 
Like other cases noted above, the cases of smuggling noted in this research are clearly in 
contravention with the ZIMRA’s vision of integrity, transparency and fairness. It also 
contravenes the ZIMR Client Charter which clearly stipulates that the organisation does not 
tolerate smuggling. 
4.5 Cases of ‘push money’ reported by the Parliamentary Committee on Budget, 
Finance and Investment Promotion 
Push money involves bribes paid by truck drivers and travellers to facilitate quick clearance 
of customs documents by touts and other people who are illegally receiving transactions on 
behalf of the ZIMRA customs officials (TMSA, 2012:3). Truck drivers travelling to other 
countries such as Malawi, Zambia and/or Tanzania find it easy to bribe customs officials in 
order to jump long queues to receive quick processing of their custom documents. According 
to TMSA (2012:3), the Parliamentary Committee on Budget, Finance and Investment 
Promotion conducted an enquiry into the ZIMRA’s operations at the border post and made 
the following findings: 
 The border had poor infrastructure that could not carry the large incoming capacity of 
traffic and travellers. 
 There was a potential health hazard as a result of non-functional toilets and ablution 
facilities. 
 Travellers spend up to eight hours while truck drivers spend more than five days at 
the border. 
 There were poor security facilities for goods in transit. 
The above cited concerns that were presented to parliament are the main contributors to push 
money corruption at Beitbridge Border Post. In the literature, it was discussed that this type 
of corruption is referred to as routine corruption. Hors (2001:14) defines routine corruption as 
a common type of corruption through which traders or travellers and trucks driver bribe 
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customs officials to gain the favour of being cleared quickly so they can proceed with their 
journey. 
Table 1: Compliance with legislation and policies 
Compliance with law and policies Issues identified 
Compliance with applicable laws. These conditions are clearly not in line with 
several provisions of the law regarding 
proper service delivery. Lack of service 
delivery in regard to health and other 
facilities violates the law and creates 
conditions that nourish corruption activities 
such as push money. 
Compliance with the ZIMRA Customs 
Policy. 
In its Client Charter, the ZIMRA promises to 
clear bona fide travels and buses within an 
hour, and cargo clearance within 48 hours, 
that is, two days (ZIMRA, n.d.).   
 
4.6 Analysing the causes of corruption at Beitbridge Border Post 
Based on the cases outlined above, it is possible to draw some insights about some of the 
common causes of corruption, as well as the conditions that promote it. The first cause of 
corruption is the low levels of salaries paid to the ZIMRA officials. Apart from these low 
salaries, the ZIMRA has been accused of excluding junior and middle management staff 
when it comes to perks such as the acquisition of vehicles at a book value (The Standard, 
2005:3). This leads many of these officers to corruption. Based on these two cases, Kenny 
(1999:6) argues that customs officials will engage in corrupt activities if the incentive of 
corruption is higher than that of their normal salary. Excluding junior and middle 
management in the acquisition of vehicles on reasonable terms motivates these very officials 
to seek bribes from the traders to purchase their own cars. The table below gives some details 
of some of the common causes of corruption at the border. 
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Table 2: Causes of corruption at the border 
Cause of corruption Detailed description 
Lack of customs services’ 
automation and 
computerisation. 
The lack of automation and computerisation is deliberately 
ignored to facilitate corruption by management. Despite the 
Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) at Beitbridge 
Border Post, corruption is still prevalent (Harare24News, 
2013:1). The existence of corruption taking place reflects how 
the technology is not sufficiently being used or the inadequacy of 
technology. Harare24News (2013:2) argues that the system 
allows corruption to take place at Beitbridge Border Post because 
it is not watertight. The ASYCUDA data entry system has some 
loopholes that allow customs officials to manipulate the data. 
Poor customs service Poor customs service is sometimes used to frustrate traders at the 
border so that they resort to bribes to avoid spending longer 
periods there with, for instance, perishable products (TMSA, 
2012:2). At the Beitbridge Border Post it has been established 
that very long queues are a strong contributing factor to 
corruption as traders try to avoid health hazards as toilets and 
ablution facilities are non-functional (TMSA, 2012:2). Invisible 
and lack of security at the border exacerbates the need to jump 
the queue in order to access a quicker clearance service (TMSA, 
2012:3). 
Family networks Most customs officials working at the border post have a 
tendency to get involved in corrupt activities involving their 
family members and other networks (TMSA, 2012:3). 
 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the causes of corruption, but simply an illustrative 
list. In view of the causes described above, it is imperative to discuss the consequences of 
corruption at Beitbridge Border Post. 
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4.7 Consequences of corruption 
In this section the consequences of corruption will be discussed, indicating whether they are 
long-term or short-term. Short-term consequences are those that can be felt immediately after 
the corruption activity has taken place, while long-term effects are those that are felt after 
some time, such as at the end of a financial year. 
4.7.1 Short-term consequences of corruption 
The artificial congestion that tends to take place at the border post is an example of short-
term consequences as some travellers are prejudiced against. This is an effect of corruption 
which is immediately felt by traders and travellers. The confiscation of corruptly smuggled 
goods is also an immediate effect of corruption, as the traders in question lose their 
possessions immediately and the effect of this corruption is felt directly after being involved 
in a corrupt activity. Losing goods after paying a bribe for smuggling is a double loss. 
Customs officials who are caught engaging in corrupt deals get suspended and lose their jobs 
immediately in most cases (Bulawayo24, 2013). This has immediate effects on them and their 
families. 
4.7.2 Long-term consequences of corruption 
A long term is normally up to a period of five years and at least one year. The first long-term 
effect is the ranking of Zimbabwe. According Transparency International (2011:4) Zimbabwe 
is ranked 154th out of 182 countries in the Corruption Perception index. On a scale of 0 to ten, 
with highly corrupt countries being rated as 0 and 10 very clean; Zimbabwe is ranked 2.2 
(Transparency International, 2011:4). The prevalence of corruption has increased in recent 
decades in Zimbabwe as indicated by their decline from 3.0 to 2.2 in 2011 (DFID, 2013:1). 
The rankings are monitoring and evaluation surveys are conducted on the corruption 
perceptions of a country by Transparency International. Such poor rankings affect the 
confidence of investors and the donor community that has helped Zimbabwe during difficult 
times (DFID, 2013). 
Loss of revenue is another consequence of corruption that has a longer effect on government 
delivery. Since smuggling is a way to avoid paying customs levies, one of the severest results 
of this adverse practice is the reduction of government revenue, which may result in poor 
service delivery. Apart from loss of revenue resulting from smuggling, banned commodities 
are often smuggled across borders with very negative downstream effects. According to the 
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betrayal of trust theory (Rotberg, 2009:31), the ZIMRA customs officers involved in corrupt 
deals give the organisation a bad name and lead to a trust deficit as people tend to lose 
confidence in the organisation. In accordance with the ZIMRA’s mandate derived from the 
Revenue Authority Act, Chapter 23:11 and Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 9:16, it is 
the responsibility of customs officers to detect criminal activities or corrupt activities so as to 
fulfil the organisation’s mandate and standards. Doing otherwise erodes the trust bestowed on 
the organisation. Reduced trust between state organs and citizens has a damming effect on the 
reputation of the country. Traders have lost trust for the ZIMRA customs officers and the 
police because of their routine failure to execute their constitutional mandates. 
Corruption compromises international or regional relations. The traders from regional 
countries who traditionally use Zimbabwe’s Beitbridge port of entry for transit have decided 
to use a new bridge across the Zambezi at Kazungula, Botswana, as a way of avoiding long 
queues and corrupt customs officials in Zimbabwe (TMSA, 2012:1). The diverting of traffic 
will cost the country millions of dollars in transit and business incomes (TMSA, 2012:1). It is 
clear that the reason for the construction of another bridge by regional states is as a result of 
the perception that the government of Zimbabwe is not willing to deal with corruption and, 
therefore, avoiding transiting through Beitbridge will be a lasting solution. Clearly corruption 
has implications on traders, the ZIMRA customs and the government of Zimbabwe. 
4.8 Implications of corruption on systems 
Persistent corruption within the ZIMRA has far-reaching systemic effects that require some 
analysis. It important to understand that because of corruption taking place at Beitbridge 
Border Post, the government of Zimbabwe has had to spend more resources developing 
systems and means to combat corruption. In order to modernise customs clearance services 
while also combating corruption, the ZIMRA introduced ASYCUDA, a data-entry system 
with a networked presence, allowing for remote monitoring and verification. (ZIMRA, 
2013:1) The introduction of ASYCUDA was a huge capital investment by the ZIMRA 
Customs Department aimed at, among other things, plugging revenue leaks that were 
haemorrhaging the organisation through corruption and inefficiency (Hove, 2012:2). The 
introduction of ASYCUDA can be regarded as enforced modernisation as the matter was 
made much more urgent by rampant corruption. 
However, despite huge capital investment in internal controls and systems modernisation to 
mitigate revenue leakages at the border, corrupt customs officers and traders still manipulate 
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such systems as the ASYCUDA data entry system has to be used with other software (Hove, 
2012:6). It is therefore a huge cost to the government of Zimbabwe to invest in technology 
that still gets manipulated. The ineffectiveness of the ASYCUDA to completely address 
corruption has led to the introduction of body searches which have sparked international 
condemnation and consequently affected the tourism and hospitality industry 
(Harare24News, 2013:1). When the tourism and hospitality industry is affected this has 
serious implications on foreign currency generation and employment creation. 
As Beitbridge is the busiest port of entry into Zimbabwe and across the region, it is important 
to explore other possible remedies for corruption. 
4.8.1 Possible remedies for corruption 
The need for lasting solutions to corruption in Zimbabwe is eminently clear and very urgent. 
The following could be some of the possible remedies to corruption at the ZIMRA customs at 
Beitbridge Border Post: 
 Review of legislation/policies dealing with corruption in order to achieve 
coordination. PSA (2001:3) argues that no single anti-corruption agency has the 
capacity to address corruption, but this requires more coordinated efforts from other 
agencies. A coordinated effort in dealing with corruption is important. The ZIMRA 
customs can align its policies with legislation dealing with economic crimes in 
Zimbabwe such as the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 9:16; Serious Offences 
Act, Chapter 9:17; and Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act, Chapter 9:07. The 
pieces of legislation need to be used with special courts set to address the issue of 
corruption. Competent personnel need training in regard to corruption cases. 
Criminals always try to circumvent provisions of the Acts in order to enhance their 
corrupt activities at the Border. Harare24News (2013:1) reported on the acquittal of 
ZIMRA customs officials who were suspended on allegations of corruption at 
Beitbridge Border. There is no clear evidence of the alleged accusations of corruption. 
In light of this view, it is clear that the concerned officers used the Act itself to 
circumvent the procedure of the law. The reconstruction of institutional structures 
needs to be well-designed through a democratic participation that involves all 
stakeholders. In concurrence with this, Uneke (2010:122) reaffirms that the 
legislations and polices must be based on popular participation, rule of law, 
accountability and transparency in governance. Indeed the Zimbabwe government, in 
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conjunction with the Anti-Corruption Commission is spearheads formulation of 
legislation/policies in combating corruption in hotspots such as Beitbridge Border 
Post. 
 Restructuring the institutions dealing with corruption at Beitbridge: The invisibility of 
security at the border post may be a factor contributing to corruption. Dealing with 
corruption requires combined efforts starting with the police force being deployed to 
deal with corruption at the border post. TMSA (2012:4) outlined the recommendation 
by the Budget, Finance and Investment Promotion that the deployment of more police 
and security is an urgent need. These must be specialised units who are trained to 
investigate and detect corruption from both traders and the ZIMRA customs officials. 
Another restructure required is the introduction of specialised courts with the 
competency to deal with corruption cases. There must be an independent oversight 
body monitoring the operations of ZIMRA customs employees and their conduct 
during working hours. Unauthorised persons should be cleared from the border and 
loitering prohibited. 
 A further security-related matter should be improvement in lighting. The Beitbridge 
Border Post has challenges with lighting as the country battles to generate enough 
electricity; hence load-shedding provides opportunities for corrupt activities. More 
lighting is required during the night to allow greater visibility for ZIMRA customs 
officials and law enforcement agents. Furthermore, there should be surveillance 
cameras. 
 Creation of a climate that makes engaging in corruption difficult: this should include 
sterner punishment for officials and traders engaging in corrupt activities. Naming and 
shaming should be adopted. 
 Elimination of clearance agents: there is no doubt that the presence of clearance 
agencies within the border post has attracted bogus agencies. The Herald (2012:2) 
reported on the suspension of five ZIMRA customs officials for facilitating the 
acquisition of fake permits by bogus clearance agents. This suggests that the 
proliferation and presence of clearing agents has an influence on the facilitation of 
corruption. To avoid such corruption cases it is important to limit/eliminate the 
facilitation of customs clearance and the forwarding of exports and imports where 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
possible. Research conducted at Beitbridge Border Post revealed that traders have 
employed what are locally known as ‘permanent runners’ to bribe customs officials to 
facilitate easy clearance processes of their declaration documents as they have the 
knowledge as well as close networks with customs officials to facilitate transactions 
through bribes (Tizova, 2009:31). An interview conducted revealed the need to ban 
people who find their way into the border premises as their role is to facilitate 
transactions between the customs officers and traders. For example runners charge 
$100 to facilitate the clearance of a truck loaded with beverages from South Africa 
(Tizova, 2009:22). 
 Capacitating ZIMRA customs to deal with corruption: The Beitbridge Border Post has 
been characterised as having long queues and delays that last for about five to eight 
days. These delays suggest the incapacity of ZIMRA customs to efficiently manage 
huge volumes of traffic and travellers. There is a need to increase the number of 
ZIMRA customs officials at the border. Poverello (2012:1) laments the under-staffing 
at Beitbridge Border Post which requires around the clock customs officers who can 
work efficiently. The shortage of customs officers has resulted in long queues which 
attract touts and bogus clearing agents who find their way into the customs yard to 
swindle traders and travellers of their money. Increasing the number of customs 
officers will increase speed and efficiency, which will obviate the need to pay bribes 
in order to jump the line or to access quicker processing of documentation. 
Despite the growing involvement in dealing corruption and increased resources to combat 
corruption it still not clear which remedy is more appropriate. The suggested remedies could 
work but this does not necessarily mean that they will be successful at Beitbridge Border 
Post. However, they are worth implementing in order to improve the situation. Another 
important facet in dealing with corruption is developing anti-corruption strategies for ZIMRA 
customs. In the next segment, the study will analyse in further detail the initiatives that have 
been taken by the ZIMRA Customs Department to combat corruption at the Beitbridge 
Border Post. 
4.9 ZIMRA anti-corruption systems and strategies and at Beitbridge Border Post  
Successful anti-corruption strategies are linked to an in-depth analysis of the nature and cause 
of corruption at Beitbridge Border. This thesis will look at different anti-corruption strategies 
in a broader context than ZIMRA customs use at Beitbridge. These strategies include 
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automation, sniffer dogs, incentives and awards, skills development, highway and border 
patrols, online audits, increased penalties on offenders, awareness campaigns, cargo 
monitoring, compliance with policies/legislation, decentralisation, body searches, rewarding 
of whistle-blowers, and the accreditation of clearing agents, among other things. 
4.9.1 Automation programme as an anti-corruption strategy 
ZIMRA customs has introduced the ASYCUDA as means of enhancing efficiency in the 
processing of import/export taxes. The ASYCUDA software was introduced in October 2011 
and the system is praised for being more efficient and advanced for customs data processing 
via the internet (The Herald, 2012:2). According to ZIMRA (2011:1) the ASYCUDA system 
was aimed at reducing corruption within customs by reducing the chances of interface among 
wheeler-dealers, employees and clients. The introduction of ASYCUDA was a huge stride in 
the anti-corruption strategy as many ZIMRA customs officers who tried to fake 
documentation could be discovered during auditing. Also Harare24News (2013:1) cited the 
investigation of four revenue officers for undervaluing vehicles or alteration of customs 
documents. The investigation was prompted by anomalous data that the ASYCUDA system 
had conveyed.  
ASYCUDA is part of e-governance and this has been known to be an effective way of 
promoting transparency. The fact that the ASYCUDA software can allow clients to process 
their export and import documents online and at the same time can be monitored by a third 
party elsewhere makes it an effective tool for ensuring transparency in an organisation such 
as the ZIMRA. According to UNODCCP (2001:18) transparency is fundamental for reducing 
corruption in an organisation. The system is also used as an auditing tool after border 
transactions have been completed. 
4.9.2 Baggage scanners 
The introduction of scanners by ZIMRA at Beitbridge Border Post also reinforced the 
strategy of identifying smuggled goods and dangerous substances, which is more often done 
in collusion with corrupt officials. Scanners were introduced in 2003 at this port of entry and 
exit (ZIMRA, 2013:1). However, for scanners to be effective they must be operated by honest 
employees who could monitor and follow up on any suspicious items. The use of scanners 
has successfully yielded results at Beitbridge Border Post as ZIMRA was, at one point, able 
to intercept 1.17 tonnes of smuggled copper heading for South Africa within three days 
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(ZIMRA, 2013:1). This is an indication that, if operated by honest people, scanners are 
important instruments for combating corruption. 
4.9.3 Use of sniffer dogs to detect smuggled goods 
On some occasions ZIMRA agents have had to use sniffer dogs to assist in the detection of 
substances that could not be detected by scanners, for instance, prohibited agricultural 
commodities and drugs. Sniffer dogs were introduced in 2012 (ZIMRA, 2013:3) to avoid 
body searches that drew local and international condemnation because of the invasiveness of 
the practice and its contravention of the Chicago Convention (Harare24News, 2013:1). These 
dogs are trained to detect substances hidden by traders and travellers. The effectiveness of 
this strategy is yet to be established. 
4.9.4 Border and highway patrols 
Border patrols are important to combat bogus and touts at the border premises. For security 
reasons it important for security forces to be visible around the border. In addition, all goods 
that go through the border undeclared or undervalued with the help of customs officers could 
be discovered on highway patrols by ZIMRA customs officers and police. Such goods are 
impounded. According to the ZIMRA Newsletter (2011:1) border and highway patrols have 
been a relatively successful strategy, with cases of the interception of smuggled goods being 
reported.  
4.9.5 Incentive and rewards strategies 
An incentive is a privilege given to anyone for doing business with, or on behalf of, an 
organisation loyally. ZIMRA has had incentive schemes which allow clients of the ZIMRA 
customs unit to voluntarily pay their levies in order to gain some tax incentives such as 
rebates (ZIMRA, 2013:2). Incentives have created some form of compliance among ZIMRA 
customs clients who feel acknowledged in their dealings with the organisation. In essence, 
these incentives are an effective strategy for combatting corruption as clients tend to 
voluntarily comply with the law. This undercuts corrupt officers. Incentives are also given to 
the ZIMRA employees. For instance, the ZIMRA Motor Vehicle Acquisition Policy was 
introduced in 2012 as a way of giving incentives to employees in a way that would minimise 
corruption (The Standard, 2012:3). Employees were allowed to buy/import cars on 
favourable terms so as to obviate the need to get more money through corrupt dealings. 
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A system of rewards has also been used to increase motivation among employees and 
hopefully reduce corruption. ZIMRA customs at Beitbridge Border Post has given awards to 
long-serving customs officers who have served the organisation with diligence and integrity 
for ten years (ZIMRA, 2013:2). As some researchers have argued, if rewards surpass the 
benefit of corruption employees tend to avoid corruption and vice-versa (UNODCCP, 
2001:20). These awards were introduced in 2009 (ZIMRA, 2013:20). However, there is no 
scientific data linking the reduction of corruption to the improved morals of employees. 
4.9.6 Awareness campaigns 
Anti-corruption strategies without awareness campaigns to the public are doomed to fail. The 
ZIMRA has done some awareness campaigns evidenced by pamphlets distributed at 
Beitbridge Border, the broadcasting of messages in various radio and television channels, and 
billboards mounted in major streets and at the border (ZIMRA, 2013:1). These outlets carry 
messages educating traders and employees about the negative effects of corruption on the 
economy and society at large. In 2012, the Committee on Budget, Finance and Investment 
Promotion made recommendations to ZIMRA customs at Beitbridge that the organisation 
embark on more vigorous awareness campaigns (TMSA, 2012:4). Apart from just awareness 
campaigns, TMSA (2012:4) said that the ZIMRA staff must also undergo training and 
refresher courses in public relations and customer care. However, the success of these 
awareness campaigns in reducing corruption at Beitbridge Border is difficult to quantify as 
there are no readily available statistics that suggest a reduction in cases of corruption that can 
be linked to such campaigns. It is, however, important to note that their utility cannot be 
merely dismissed (UNODCCP, 2001:19). 
4.9.7 Penalties for corruption cases 
Penalties are regarded as a way of not only punishing offenders but also providing a deterrent 
message to would-be offenders. Some corrupt officials within the ZIMRA have been 
summarily suspended as a way of punishing their negative behaviour. In 2010 the Minister of 
Finance suggested the imposition of stiffer penalties for economic crimes such as corruption 
and smuggling (ZIMRA, 2012:1). However, there is no clear evidence that this has worked to 
eradicate corruption. In some instances, investigations reach a dead end due to a number of 
inefficiencies and blockages caused by the general systemic malaise. For instance, the four 
officers discussed earlier in the chapter who were suspended were later acquitted because of a 
lack of unequivocal evidence (Harare24News, 2013:2). Their acquittal, despite the strong 
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prima facie case suggests that the system does not have enough resources to address the cases 
effectively. 
4.9.8 Protection of witnesses and whistle-blowers 
Protection of witnesses and whistle-blowers is a useful strategy to give citizens a stronger 
hand in the fight against corruption. A whistle-blower refers to a person who reports any 
shady activity they witness in an organisation (Wilmot, 2000:1051). There are many actions 
that can be defined as wrongdoings depending on the context of the study. For the purpose of 
the research, a wrongdoing involves the public office bearer seeking bribes, corrupting the 
public such as by misdeclaration of imports in return payment. It also involves abuse of 
public office for personal gain (Klopper, 1997:240). To encourage whistle-blowers to come 
forward with information, the ZIMRA introduced an incentive system whereby any 
individual providing specific information leading to the recovery of revenue is rewarded with 
10% of the value of the recovered goods (ZIMRA, 2013:1). However, there are still some 
complications as the protection of whistle-blowers is still weak and needs strengthening. 
Related to this issue, it is not clear how the media, which has been immensely involved in 
reporting cases, is treated. It is not clear whether media organisations and journalists are 
honoured and recognised for their role in exposing corruption. A clear partnership is certainly 
required. 
4.9.9 Effective investigation and criminal justice 
A quick criminal justice response is an imperative in any successful fight against corruption. 
The SADC has a standing recommendation that anti-corruption strategies in member states 
must be underpinned by dedicated anti-corruption agencies or units with special investigating 
tools and powers and an effective criminal justice system (Zvekic, 2002:3). Delays in 
prosecution and incapacity to deal with implicated people has the effect of letting criminals 
escape justice, which further makes a mockery of whatever initiatives are there to ostensibly 
curb corruption (NORAD, 2009:10). It is important that the courts be readily available to 
prosecute perpetrators. In fact there must be a special court for such culprits. The Zimbabwe 
government has no special courts to deal with cases of corruption, and this leads to delays. 




As the main objective of the study is the analysis of corruption and anti-corruption strategies 
at Beitbridge Border, this chapter attempted to provide examples and an analysis of different 
types of corrupt activities. Among others, some common types of corruption identified 
included smuggling, push-money, bribes and customs duty evasion. The chapter further 
analysed the consequences of corruption on society, the government and the ZIMRA itself. 
The chapter revealed that corruption has a tendency to breed more corruption if left 
unattended. It was underscored that corruption impacts negatively on revenue collection with 
significantly adverse implications for the country. The chapter also discussed some of the 
anti-corruption systems and strategies in place, including the introduction of ASYCUDA, 
scanners, sniffer dogs, and incentives. The main conclusion of the chapter is that the systems 
in place seem to be effective at face value, but in actual fact they have so far failed to curb 
corruption. However, this is not to ignore the cases that have been discovered. The discovery 
of the cases both indicate the relative success and failure of systems that are in place. The 
next part of thesis provides a summary of findings and main conclusions of the study. 
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Chapter 5: Summary, Findings and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
This final chapter of the thesis provides an overview analysis of the findings of the study and, 
in summary form, provides commentary on what the overall problem bedevilling the 
ZIMRA’s anti-corruption strategies could be. The chapter presents the crucial overall 
findings in respect of the various tests applied to both cases and strategies discussed in the 
preceding chapter. 
5.2 Summary 
The situation of endemic corruption and the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption strategies have 
a lot to do with the very weak political economy of Zimbabwe. The failure of Zimbabwe’s 
economy to absorb the labour force and to efficiently produce enough goods and services for 
its citizens has contributed to the exodus of Zimbabweans to neighbouring countries such as 
South Africa which is estimated to be hosting about two million people. This exodus has 
increased pressure on the Beitbridge Border, creating congestion and subsequently breeding 
corruption. A general economic malaise has also forced the ZIMRA officers to solicit bribes 
from travellers and traders. Dealing with this rampant corruption has been an Achilles’ heel 
for the ZIMRA. 
According to a great deal of literature scoped and analysed in this thesis, dealing with 
corruption requires a combination of robust strategies from different angles, including 
political will, massive educational awareness, addressing remuneration of customs officials 
and effective law enforcement, complemented with an effective justice system. More 
importantly, the implementation of anti-corruption strategies such as the automation of 
systems and the mounting of highway patrols should be effectively conducted to reduce and 
eradicate corruption. However, although the ZIMRA has tried all these initiatives, 
effectiveness is still a challenge, as indicated below. The following analysis will begin with 
positive findings and end with the negative. 
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5.3 Findings: Success of ZIMRA anti-corruption strategies  
The following are the identified successes of ZIMRA in combating corruption at Beitbridge 
Border Post: 
 The ZIMRA customs at Beitbridge has successfully introduced the automation that 
has managed to facilitate the arrests of some corrupt officials who connive with touts 
and bogus clearing agents. 
 Some smugglers who subvert the customs laws and controls by bribing customs 
officials or using other routes other than the border port of entry and exit, have also 
been caught and exposed. Highway patrols, roadblocks and other initiatives have been 
used with occasional success. 
 The installation of scanners to detect banned substances such as drugs and other 
objects such as minerals has led to the successful detection of illegal goods smuggled 
in and out of the country. 
 The introduction of in-service training of the ZIMRA staff on the new tax methods 
and technology available. 
 ZIMRA has successfully managed to facilitate the introduction of a fiscal 
undergraduate and post graduate degree at National University of Science and 
Technology as a means to equip the ZIMRA’s required personnel of fiscal skills such 
as knowledge about exports and imports. The skill acquired by students has allowed 
ZIMRA to recruit personnel with required skills. 
 Honouring long-serving ZIMRA staff with a long-term service award and benefits 
such as the vehicle scheme policy. These incentives have allowed most ZIMRA 
customs officials to purchase vehicles at low cost. The benefits have created 
confidence in ZIMRA officials and retained their loyalty to the organisation. 
 ZIMRA has embarked on the education of traders through posters and broadcasting 
on television and radios. These campaigns create awareness on the negative effects of 
corruption on the economy and the moral standing of the society. 
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5.4 Findings: Gaps/weaknesses in ZIMRA anti-corruption 
Some of the key findings in regard to gaps/weaknesses include the following: 
Non-compliance with legislation: the evidence analysed indicated that the ZIMRA officials 
did not comply with legislation relating to corrupt-free practices. Non-compliance with 
legislation is a serious issue that requires urgent attention. 
There is still ineffective use of scanners by the ZIMRA customs and the members of the 
police force. Dangerous and banned goods and substances still find their way in and out the 
country despite the presence of the scan. Traders and travellers avoid passing near the scan. 
Also the scan lacks recorded footage to be monitored by other independent oversight bodies. 
The ASYCUDA world software can only be used in conjunction with other software. This 
has created a loophole in the system by which customs officials circumvent the procedures of 
the system as it cannot detect fake details if fake details were used in the previous system. 
 The Zimbabwean government has a serious shortage of electricity, therefore as the 
systems work via the internet, during load shedding customs officials and touts take 
advantage of the situation to engage in corruption.  
 There has been controversy surrounding the vehicle incentive scheme that has been 
criticised for only catering to top management. This therefore defeats the purpose of 
trying to create incentives that could help in the fight against corruption. 
 There is too much loitering and too many uncontrolled people within the border 
premises. This has created an influx of touts and bogus clearing agents. 
 Lack of visibility of the ZRP and other security enforcement agencies have led to a 
security vacuum and lack of oversight and surveillance that are helpful in any fight 
against corruption. 
 The border is manned by poorly remunerated security guards who cannot resist 
corruption. These security guards allow smugglers to pass through without their goods 
being declared at customs. 
 There is also lack of coordination and complementary support between the many 
agencies such as the ZIMRA and ZACC. This had led to the duplication of duties, 
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wastage of resources and general inefficiency. This has been worsened by general 
lack of political will or a general inability to provide effective leadership. 
5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study indicates that Zimbabwe’s major impediments to optimal revenue collection at 
border posts, and in particular at Beitbridge Border Post, is corruption which manifests itself 
in smuggling and bribes facilitated by revenue officials and touts. Although the ZIMRA 
customs unit has enough anti-corruption strategies in its toolkit, there is a serious problem 
with implementation, while corruption has continued unabated. It is evident that corruption 
can be contained by current anti-corruption strategies if the ZIMRA could clearly integrate its 
operational mandate with other anti-corruption agents. However, this will also require an 
optimal political economy environment that will provide a strong base for anti-corruption 
initiatives. 
The huge amount of poverty in Zimbabwe is the main driving force behind corruption and a 
main hindrance undermining the existing anti-corruption strategies. In as much as ZIMRA 
has enough strategies to combat corruption, poverty levels have severely weakened these 
strategies and rendered them virtually useless. Traders smuggle for survival hence it is not 
easy to deal with such perverse activities as long as they are driven by poverty and the need 
to survive. A combination of congestion and poor sanitary facilities within the border 
precincts all contribute to an environment conducive for the emergence and development of 
corruption. In order to address corruption, issues of congestion and sanitation will have to be 
tackled first. 
In addition, the following recommendations are made by way of re-emphasising some 
important things that the ZIMRA needs do in order to rid Beitbridge Border Post of corrupt 
elements: 
 Restructuring of the ZIMRA management and rotating the station of operation to 
avoid creation of accomplices. 
 Minimisation of artificial congestion which results in the seeking of bribes by officers 
who take advantage of travellers who are keen to experience quicker processing of 
their passage through the border in order to continue with their journey. 
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 More education and campaigns are required to educate traders and travellers on about 
corruption as well as clearance procedures in order to avoid the necessity of asking for 
assistance from agents. 
 Development of internal mechanisms to root out corruption within the ZIMRA 
organisation. 
 ZIMRA as a state enterprise should develop and nurture culture of excellent service in 
order to create public confidence in the institution. The organisation must also operate 
under a specialised oversight body. 
 There must be asset disclosure of all ZIMRA staff and their immediate families. 
These audits should be done every year to assess their wealth accumulation. 
5.6 Further research study 
This research study is not exhaustive and thus it recommends further research on the anti-
corruption strategies within the ZIMRA customs unit at Beitbridge Border Post. A full 
quantitative study is particularly required in order to shed light on the nature of revenue 
leakages and also to illuminate the impact of individual anti-corruption strategies. 
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